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Justice Gray famously wrote in The Paquete Habana' that
"[i]ntemational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination., 2 The succeeding century has seen a great deal of sparring
among courts and commentators as to what, exactly, that memorable phrase
means for the status of international law within the domestic legal system.
The Paquete Habana itself concerned customary international law, and
scholars continue to debate whether that law amounts to supreme federal
law. 3 More recently, controversy has shifted to the domestic status of
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1. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
2. Id. at 700.
3. See, e.g., Tim Wu,Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REv. 571, 572 (2007) ("[J]udicial treaty
enforcement is widely seen as unpredictable, erratic, and confusing. As a result, the question of
treaty enforcement has become a leading question in both American jurisprudence and the study of
Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
international law.").
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5
treaties.4 The Supremacy Clause plainly makes treaties "part of our law";
the question is what that status entails for the interpretation and enforcement
of treaty provisions.
The interpretation and force of treaties in domestic courts lie at the heart
of a line of recent cases concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (VCCR).6 The VCCR requires law enforcement officials to notify
foreign nationals whom they arrest of the foreign nationals' right to consult
with their consulates. 7 Dual opinions by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), culminating in its 2004 Avena 8 decision, found the United States in
violation of the VCCR and required American courts to give the treaty effect,
notwithstanding domestic doctrines limiting the enforceability of its provisions in certain circumstances. 9 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected Avena's

InternationalLaw as FederalCommon Law: A Critiqueof the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 861 (1997) (arguing that customary norms should not be treated as supreme federal law unless
the political branches take action to incorporate them into U.S. law), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1861 (1998) (arguing that
customary international norms automatically have the domestic status of federal law). For my own
assessment of those issues, see Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary
International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365, 462-63 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Customary
InternationalLaw]. I argue that customary international law should be treated as "general" rather
than federal law for supremacy and jurisdictional purposes but that domestic courts can apply such
law when ordinary choice of law principles permit. Id.
4. Compare, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding,and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land, " 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2123-24
(1999), Carlos Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2176-98 (1999), and
Carlos Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and Presumption of SelfExecution, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 619-22 (2008) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the
Land] (all relying on statements from the Philadelphia Convention and early Supreme Court cases
to argue that-in the domestic law context-treaties are self-executing), with John C. Yoo, Treaties
and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-self-execution, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 2218, 2223-39 (1999), and John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1312-25 (2002) (both relying on the structure of the
Constitution, the ratifying debates, and other early cases to conclude that-in the domestic law
context-treaties are non-self-executing).
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
6. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
7. Id. art. 36(l)(a), (c).
8. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar.
31), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf.
9. Id.; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). Additionally, based on
alleged violations of the VCCR, the ICJ issued in 1998 a provisional stay-of-execution order for a
Paraguayan national on death row; however, Paraguay withdrew its petition shortly after the
convict's execution, thus the ICJ never issued a final opinion on the merits of that case. Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Provisional Measures Order of
Apr. 9); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Discontinuance
Order of Nov. 10).
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construction of the treaty in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,'° refusing to give
much deference to the ICJ's interpretation."'
The VCCR saga took a more curious turn when, in a rare fit of
multilateralism, President George W. Bush sought to enforce the ICJ's
judgment by directing an unusual executive order to the state courts. 2 The
Supreme Court rejected the President's effort in Medellin v. Texas,' 3 and it
further held that ICJ judgments lack "self-executing" effect within the domestic legal system.' 4 Medellin's latter holding was the first Supreme Court
intervention in recent memory into a longstanding debate among the courts
of appeals (and scholars of foreign relations law) concerning when a treaty
should be considered to have domestic legal force without further action by
the national political branches.
This extraordinary sequence of rulings and events concerning the
VCCR may well be sui generis in any number of ways, but the issues of
interpretive deference and self-execution that it raises are likely to recur
across any number of other treaty regimes, from trade to terrorism. In debates about the domestic status of international law generally, internationalists typically invoke The Paquete Habana for the proposition that5
domestic courts and officials should be more receptive to international law;
nationalists, on the other hand, generally seek to maintain a firewall between
international and domestic law, and to leave decisions about which norms
pass through that firewall to national political officials.' 6 I argue here that,
contrary to conventional assumptions, The Paquete Habana principle does
not necessarily support various internationalist doctrinal prescriptions and
that, properly considered, it frequently buttresses more nationalist positions.
The point is a general one.
In an earlier piece on customary
international law (CIL), I argued that the "modern position"-which treats
CIL norms as supreme federal law with binding effect in every case within
the scope of those norms-is not actually consistent with the way federal
common law works.' 7 Rather, federal courts articulate federal common law
rules only when the otherwise-applicable state law would conflict with some
particular federal interest (and not some generic federal interest in

10. 548 U.S. 331, 353 (2006) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
11. See id. at 353-55 (downplaying the argument that the ICJ's decisions or interpretations are
conclusive upon U.S. courts).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 276-78.
13. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
14. Id. at 1360.
15. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary InternationalLaw as Federal
Common Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 393, 393 ("For decades, federal courts have cited
[The Paquete Habana] for the proposition that customary international law is a part of federal
common law ... ").
16. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 866-68 (arguing that federal courts should
enforce customary international law only when domestic political actors have acted to incorporate it
into domestic law).
17. Young, Customary InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 435-38.
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"uniformity" for its own sake). 18 Treating CIL as part of our law would thus
subject it to the same highly contextual conflicts analysis that federal courts
apply in domestic cases not governed by federal statutes, treaties, or constitutional provisions. 19
This Article makes a similar point about treaties. As internationalist
scholars often point out, the Supremacy Clause explicitly recognizes treaties
as supreme federal law. 20 These scholars often argue that proper respect for
treaties requires that domestic courts defer to interpretations of treaty
provisions by supranational bodies 2 1 and that treaties be treated as (at least

But these internationalist
presumptively) self-executing in all instances.2
conclusions do not necessarily follow from the premise that treaties are the
supreme law of the land. Taking treaties seriously as part of our law-that
is, treating them the same way we treat federal statutes and constitutional
provisions-actually supports a number of conclusions generally advanced
by nationalists. First, if treaties are part of our law, then there is no reason to
defer to foreign or supranational courts in interpreting them. Rather, as the
Supreme

Court recently

recognized in Sanchez-Llamas v.

Oregon,2 3

interpreting treaties falls within the Court's familiar duty to "say what the

18. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) ("[W]hen courts decide to fashion
rules of federal common law, 'the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law ...must first be specifically shown."' (quoting
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966))); United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440
U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979) (affirming that when "federal interests are sufficiently implicated to
warrant the protection of federal law ... federal courts [should] fill the interstices of federal
legislation 'according to their own standards' but "when there is little need for a nationally uniform
body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision" (quoting Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943))). See generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption and
Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1665 (2008) ("There is no power to
routinely 'federalize' state law rules, unless the conflict with federal interests is itself a persistent
one, most likely created by an ongoing federal need for a uniform rule.").
19. Young, Customary InternationalLaw, supra note 3, at 445-50.
20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21. See, e.g., Jennifer Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV.
429, 495 (2003) ("An antiparohical, prodialogic default rule that balances concerns about national
sovereignty, the relative expertise of international courts, and the benefits of greater coherence and
consistency in interpretation would specify that national courts interpreting international law should
consider relevant decisions of international courts, as well as the context in which they were
rendered, and should not depart from them without clearly articulating reasons for doing so.").
22. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201

(2d ed. 1996) ("What seems clear, from the language of the Constitution and of John Marshall, is
that in the United States the strong presumption should be that a treaty or a treaty provision is selfexecuting, and that a non-self-executing promise is highly exceptional."); Flaherty, supra note 4, at
2099 (asserting that history supports the self-execution orthodoxy); Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of
the Land, supra note 4, at 602 ("[T]he Supremacy clause is best read to create a presumption that
treaties are self-executing,... a presumption that can be overcome only through a clear statement
that the obligations in a particular treaty are subject to legislative implementation.").
23. 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
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law is.",24 Second, it does not follow from a treaty's status as supreme federal
law that it is necessarily self-executing in a number of the senses in which
that term is generally employed. Domestic federal law is frequently nonself-executing: many statutes provide no private rights of action and some
impose no enforceable legal norms at all. Treating treaties as "part of our
law" thus does not absolve interpreters of the difficult task of determining
precisely what the treaty makers wished to accomplish.
My argument is that the VCCR cases represent a "normalization" of
treaty law-that is, that the Court's decisions demonstrate a determination to
approach treaties in much the same way that the Court approaches statutes
and other more familiar forms of federal law. Just as federal statutes are not
necessarily self-executing, so too with treaties. This uniform approach
makes sense in a world where treaties and statutes increasingly address the
same sorts of problems and have similar effects on settled domestic practices.
If Medellin and Sanchez-Llamas do, in fact, represent an effort to consolidate
the treatment of these disparate forms of supreme federal law, then the
VCCR cases will have far-reaching (although not surprising) implications.
Part I of this Article discusses the question of interpretive authority.
Part II addresses the self-execution problem. Part III considers the more
general matter of normalizing treaty law.
I.

Interpretive Authority

Treaties have a dual existence: they are part of international law and, by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause, 25 simultaneously part of "the supreme Law
of the Land. 26 They are thus necessarily shared law among multiple
jurisdictions and multiple interpreters, including not only the courts of other
signatory nations but also, for some treaties, supranational judicial bodies
like the ICJ. This situation necessarily raises questions of interpretive primacy and deference: When a domestic court must construe a treaty
provision, to what extent should it defer to prior interpretations of the same
provision by foreign or supranational courts?

24. Id. at 353-54 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), for the
proposition that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is").
25. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl.2. The Supremacy Clause states,

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
26. See Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SuP. CT. REV. 131, 182
[hereinafter Bradley, Self-Execution] ("[T]reaties have a dual nature in that they are situated in the
domain of international politics as well as in the domain of law ....).
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In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion
insisted on the Supreme Court's own primary authority-and obligation-to
"say what the law is," even in cases involving treaties. 27 I argue here that
this was exactly the right thing to do and that arguments for more binding
forms of deference, founded either in notions of "comity" or in analogies to
the treatment of judgments in private law cases, are unpersuasive. 28 This
Article discusses comity as well as three other models of interpretive
deference grounded in domestic law. None of these models, I contend,
adequately captures the function of the Supreme Court in interpreting treaty
obligations.
A.

Sanchez-Llamas, Avena, and the Problem of Interpretive Deference

The Sanchez-Llamas litigation involved two consolidated cases arising
under the VCCR. Article 36 of the Convention guarantees that consular
officials of signatory nations will have access to their nationals when
officials of another signatory nation detain those nationals.2 9 When they
detain a foreign national, government authorities must notify that national's
consulate if he requests it, and they must inform the detained foreign national
of this right "without delay.", 30 Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national,
was convicted in Oregon state court of attempted aggravated murder after 3a
shoot-out with police and sentenced to twenty and one-half years in prison. 1
Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national, was convicted in Virginia state court of
first-degree murder after a fight outside a restaurant and sentenced to thirty
years in prison.32 Neither Mr. Sanchez-Llamas nor Mr. Bustillo was notified
by police of his rights under the VCCR.33
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Sanchez-Llamas and
Mr. Bustillo presented quite different issues. Sanchez-Llamas had invoked
his VCCR rights before the state courts and sought to suppress incriminating
statements that he made to police prior to notification of the Mexican

27. 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006).
28. For a characteristically forceful argument, grounded in constitutional text, that American
courts should not defer to supranational bodies when interpreting a treaty, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The ConstitutionalPower to InterpretInternationalLaw, 118 YALE L. J. 1762, 1804-07 &
n.113 (2009).
29. VCCR, supra note 6, art. 36(1)(a), (c).
30. Id. art. 36(i)(b). That provision provides,
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner .... The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.
Id.
31. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 339-40.
32. Id. at 340-41.
33. Id. at 339-41.
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consulate. 34 His appeal therefore asked whether the Miranda-style exclusion
of evidence is a proper remedy for violation of a foreign national's rights under the VCCR.35 Bustillo, on the other hand, failed to raise the VCCR issue
before the state trial court or on direct review; he presented the issue for the
first time in a state petition for habeas corpus.36 His case thus concerned
whether the doctrine of procedural default-which holds that a habeas
petitioner's failure to comply with state procedural rules for presenting
38
37
federal claims bars collateral review on habeas -applies to VCCR claims.
Although I will have a few things to say about the exclusionary-rule
issue, my primary concern here is with the Court's resolution of Mr.
Bustillo's claim. What makes that claim interesting is that the central
issue-the relationship between the procedural default doctrine and the
VCCR-had already been addressed by both the Supreme Court and the ICJ.
In Breard v. Greene,39 a Paraguayan national convicted of capital murder
argued that he was entitled to raise a VCCR claim for the first time on
collateral review because "the Convention is the 'supreme law of the land'
and thus trumps the procedural default doctrine., 40 The Supreme Court rejected that argument, observing that "it has been recognized in international
law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural
rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that
State. 4 1 The ICJ reached the opposite conclusion eight years later, however,
in the Avena case. Avena, which concerned the VCCR claims of fifty-four
Mexican nationals on death row in various American states, found violations
of the Convention in the overwhelming majority of the cases, and ordered the
United States to provide "review and reconsideration" of each prisoner's
conviction and sentence.4 2 Citing its earlier decision in the LaGrand case,43
the ICJ further held that the American doctrine of procedural default violated

34. Id. at 340.
35. Id. at 339-40.
36. Id. at 341.
37. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 722-23 (1991) (holding that, because of
federalism and comity concerns, a federal habeas court may not review a state court's decision
resting on a violation of state procedural rules); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977)
(holding that, where petitioner failed to make timely objection under the state's contemporaneous
objection rule, that failure barred federal habeas review of his Mirandaclaim).
38. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 342.
39. 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
40. Id. at 375.
41. Id. As the Breardcourt noted, the VCCR itself provides that the rights it confers "shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State," provided that "said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
accorded under [the VCCR] are intended." VCCR, supra note 6, art. 36(2).
42. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 5355, 63, 65-66 (Mar. 31), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf.
43. The ICJ reached a similar conclusion about procedural default in the LaGrand case, which
involved two German nationals. (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514-17 (June 27).
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the VCCR by preventing domestic courts from giving "full effect" to the
44

treaty's provisions.
Naturally, Mr. Bustillo invoked Avena in support of his argument that
procedural default should not bar his VCCR claim. 45 An amicus brief of

"International Court of Justice Experts" went so far as to urge that "the
United States is obligated to comply with the Convention, as interpretedby
the ICJ.' ' 4 6 Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion rejected this suggestion,

however. "If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal
system," he wrote, "determining their meaning as a matter of federal law 'is
emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department,' headed by
the 'one supreme Court' established by the Constitution. '' 4 7 As a result,
"LaGrand and Avena are ... entitled only to the 'respectful consideration'

due an interpretation of an international agreement by an international
court. '48 Applying this standard, the Court rejected Avena's interpretation of
the VCCR and adhered to its own prior construction in Breard, which applied the same procedural default doctrine to VCCR
claims as that which
49
relief.
corpus
habeas
to
claim
any
blocks
potentially
Chief Justice Roberts's refusal to defer to the ICJ's interpretation of the
VCCR has been controversial.5 ° Justice Breyer's dissent was willing to

"assume that the ICJ's interpretation does not bind this Court in this case," 5'
but most observers agree that his version of "respectful consideration" was
considerably more deferential than that of the majority.52 Justice Stevens
went so far as to suggest, in an earlier VCCR case, that the ICJ's LaGrand

44. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 55-57, 63 (citing VCCR, supra note 6, art. 36(2)).
45. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 352 (2006).
46. Brief of International Court of Justice Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
11, Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (No. 04-10566) [hereinafter Brief of International Court of
Justice Experts] (emphasis added); see also Julian G. Ku, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: Stepping
Back from the New World Court Order, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 17, 20-22 (2007) (discussing
this brief).
47. 548 U.S. at 353-54 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
48. Id. at 355 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam)).
49. Id. at 356-60.
50. See, e.g., Carsten Hoppe, Implementation of LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the
United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search of a Uniform Interpretation of Consular
Rights, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 317, 330 (2007) (concluding that Chief Justice Roberts's majority
opinion "sorely disappoints" because the majority's "duty to afford 'respectful consideration' thus
seems reduced to a duty to take note of the respective decision" but "[t]he Court is free to review
the decision and to disagree with it"); John F. Murphy, Medellin v. Texas: Implications of the
Supreme Court's Decision for the United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs, 31
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 247, 265 (2008) ("[I]n Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,... the U.S.
Supreme Court handed down a decision with the potential to greatly weaken the possibility of
enforcing judgments of the ICJ.").
51. 548 U.S. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. See, e.g., Hoppe, supra note 50, at 330 (interpreting Justice Breyer's dissent as "propos[ing]
a more substantive and less confrontational view of 'respectful consideration' of ICJ judgments");
Mark L. Movsesian, Judging International Judgments, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 65, 101, 108 (2007)
(reading the dissent as embracing a more deferential "comity model" of interpretive authority).
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decision was an "authoritative interpretation of Article 36."'5 And prominent
academics have54claimed that the ICJ's interpretation binds the U.S. Supreme
Court outright.
Although we are unlikely to see much further ICJ litigation under the
VCCR itself,55 this debate has significant implications for how domestic
courts treat decisions of a burgeoning class of supranational judicial
institutions. In the remainder of this Part, I argue that none of the traditional
reasons for interpretive deference apply to treaties that are "part of our law"
under the Supremacy Clause. Indeed, such deference threatens the presumptive authority of federal courts, under Article III of the Constitution, to issue
an "independent decision of... every... question affecting the normative
56
scope of supreme law.",
B. Comity

One possible basis for deference to interpretations of treaties by
supranational or foreign courts is the foreign-relations-law doctrine of
comity. Although the Sanchez-Llamas petitioners (and Justice Breyer's
dissent) avoided explicit references to comity, important amici urged the
Court to defer to the ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR "as a matter of comity
and uniform treaty interpretation. " 57 "International comity" is a notoriously

53. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1036 (2003) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
54. See, e.g., Brief of International Court of Justice Experts, supra note 46, at 24-25 ("LaGrand
and Avena have stated an authoritative interpretation of the underlying treaty which establishes the
rule for deciding comparable questions under the same treaty henceforth."); Lori Fisler Damrosch,
Interpreting U.S. Treaties in Light ofHuman Rights Values, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 43, 56 (2003)
(arguing that the ICJ's decision in LaGrand clarified that its interpretation of the VCCR is binding
on the Supreme Court).
55. In the wake of Avena, the United States exercised its right to withdraw from the Optional
Protocol conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ in VCCR cases. See Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S.
Sec'y of State, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y-Gen. (Mar. 7, 2005) (on file at http://untreaty.un.org/
English/CNs/2005/101 200/186E.doc) (constituting notification by the United States of its
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol); see also Depositary Notification, Secretary-General,
United States of America: Notification of Withdrawal, U.N. Doc. CN. 186.2005.TREATIES-1 (Mar.
11, 2005), availableat http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1967/06/19670608%2002-19%20AM/
Actions/Related%20Documents/CN. 186.2005-Eng.pdf (acknowledging that the "United States will
no longer recognize the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in [the Optional]
Protocol").
56. James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality
of Decisionmaking Required ofArticle III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 884 (1998). One need
not accept the argument of Professors Liebman and Ryan that departures from this principle are
unconstitutional to agree that the federal courts have a strong presumptive fight to decide federal
questions for themselves.
57. Brief of Former United States Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Mario
A. Bustillo and Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 1, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No.
04-10566) [hereinafter Brief of Former United States Diplomats]; see also Brief for Amici Curiae
Republic of Honduras and Other Foreign Sovereigns in Support of Petitioners at 3, Sanchez-Llamas,
548 U.S. 331 (No. 04-10566) ("Whether or not the ICJ's Avena decision on the interpretation of the
Convention binds this Court, principles of reciprocity, comity, and uniformity of treaty
interpretation all favor following that decision.").
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ambiguous phrase in foreign relations law; as Michael Ramsey has observed,
'5 8
the term "is frequently invoked by courts but rarely defined with precision."
The Supreme Court's canonical statement of the doctrine illustrates Professor
Ramsey's point:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
its own
59
laws.

In the context of Sanchez-Llamas, comity amounted to a strong form of
interpretive deference; the amici invoked, for example, Justice Ginsburg's
statement from Medellin v. Dretke60 largely equating comity with binding
judgments: "[W]hen a judgment binds or is respected as a matter of comity, a
'let's see if we agree' approach is out of order." 6' This sort of approach thus
would foreclose an independent effort by the domestic court to "say what the
law is."
I hope to show here that "comity" is inappropriate when, as in SanchezLlamas, a domestic court must determine whether to defer to a foreign or
supranational court's interpretation of a treaty to which the United States is a
party. This situation is quite distinct from the one addressed by Justice
Ginsburg, which involved the deference owed to judgments, not
interpretations. It will help to begin by distinguishing among the several distinct principles that courts and commentators often lump indiscriminately
together under the label of "comity." When the object of comity is a foreign
judicial proceeding, those principles include: (1) various forms of abstention
in favor of ongoing or potential proceedings in the foreign forum,
(2) enforcement of judgments already concluded by the foreign forum, and
(3) acceptance of a foreign court's interpretation as evidence-possibly
conclusive evidence-of the content of foreign law. Sanchez-Llamas
implicated none of these principles.
Take abstention first. This form of comity involves deference to a
foreign proceeding (actual or potential), rather than a foreign court's
interpretation of a treaty. 62 In Sanchez-Llamas, for example, there was no

58. Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity, " 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893 (1998).
59. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
60. 544 U.S. 660 (2005).
61. Brief of Former United States Diplomats, supra note 57, at 7 (quoting Dretke, 544 U.S. at
670 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). For a discussion of the Medellin litigation, see infra Part II.
62. See, e.g., Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir.
1999) (affirming the district court's stay of American proceedings pending completion of parallel
proceedings in the High Court of St. Lucia); Turner Entm't Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d
1512, 1514 (11 th Cir. 1994) (staying American proceedings in light of ongoing legal proceedings in
Germany).
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question of deferring Bustillo's and Sanchez-Llamas's domestic criminal
prosecutions in favor of proceedings before the ICJ-neither defendant in
Sanchez-Llamas was entitled to appear before the ICJ. 63 Nor were Bustillo
or Sanchez-Llamas parties to the ICJ's Avena judgment. Mr. Bustillo was a
Honduran national, and therefore unconnected to Mexico's suit in Avena, nor
did that suit cover Mexican nationals like Mr. Sanchez-Llamas who had not
been convicted of a capital offense. 64 Petitioners were therefore not entitled
to invoke the second form of comity, which requires
enforcement of foreign
65
judgment.
that
to
party
a
of
behest
the
at
judgments
The most plausible form of comity in these cases was the third kind,
requiring domestic courts to accept a foreign court's interpretation of foreign
law as important evidence of the content of that law. 66 Courts ordinarily invoke this form of comity when, for example, deferring to a French court's
interpretation of French law. The idea is that the foreign court is applying its
own law and that it has a special relationship to that law not shared by the
domestic court. 67 But applying that notion of comity to a foreign or supranational court's interpretation of a U.S. treaty is fundamentally inconsistent
with the notion that treaties are part of our law. 68 Moreover, as I discuss further below, 69 treaties that confer jurisdiction on supranational tribunals
generally do not give those tribunals any interpretive preeminence over domestic courts that might also have to resolve disputes about the treaties'
meaning. In the absence of such a delegation, foreign or supranational courts
have no greater claim to interpretive authority over treaties than do the do63. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1059, T.S. No. 993 (declaring that only states may be parties to the ICJ).
64. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 20-21
(Mar. 31), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf.
65. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205-06 (1895) ("[When a] foreign judgment
appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the
parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its
proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and
formal record, the judgment.., should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign
court."); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[C]omity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in
domestic courts."); Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1971)
(affirming the district court's enforcement of a default judgment entered against an American
corporation by an English court). On the distinction between the force of supranational judgments
and supranational court interpretations or reasoning, see Ernest A. Young, SupranationalRulings as
Judgments and Precedents, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 477, 491-515 (2008) [hereinafter Young,
Judgments and Precedents].
66. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592, 600-01 (5th Cir. 1970) (relying on prior
decisions of Belgian courts when deciding the issue of whether, under Belgian law, the statute of
limitations for the instant action would be waivable).
67. Id. at 599; see also Ramsey, supra note 58, at 902 (observing that this form of deference
derives from the fact that the foreign court is "recognized by the foreign state as authoritative to
determine its law").
68. See Paulsen, supra note 28, at 1774 ("[lIt is important to keep in mind that when
international treaties become domestic law, they are U.S. law.").
69. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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mestic courts. The treaty is, after all, just as much a creature of U.S. law as it
is of foreign law. Hence, none of the traditional forms of international comity apply in cases like Sanchez-Llamas.
The case for deference might seem stronger under the related notion of
uniform treaty interpretation. The principle holds that when multiple nations
are party to a treaty, they ought to pay attention to one another's interpretations of that treaty to ensure that the treaty is interpreted uniformly.70
Although uniformity arguments are often used rather uncritically in the
domestic context,7 1 this principle may warrant some degree of interpretive
deference to foreign courts in certain circumstances (although it also suggests
that foreign courts should sometimes defer to our courts).
Treaty cases often involve questions, however, with respect to which

uniform treaty interpretation is impossible or irrelevant.

Consider, for

example, the two VCCR questions in Sanchez-Llamas: Should courts remedy
VCCR violations by excluding evidence at trial? And should the doctrine of
procedural default bar defendants from asserting claims under the VCCR?
These questions simply do not arise in the same way-if at all-in other legal systems. Most other legal systems do not exclude evidence as a primary
remedy for governmental misconduct,7 2 so a "uniform" interpretation might
either impose an unfamiliar remedy on other systems or carve out an odd exception to a common remedy in ours. It follows that the Sanchez-Llamas
majority would have been wrong to rely upon the failure of other signatories

to the VCCR to adopt an exclusionary remedy as a reason to deny such a
remedy in our legal system.73 Instead, the Court properly framed the relevant
question as whether "suppression is required because it is the appropriate
remedy for an Article 36 violation under United States law" 74-without regard to whether that remedy would promote uniform procedures across

signatory nations.
Similarly, the issue of procedural default arises only if a legal system
allows some form of collateral review of an initial criminal conviction, but
70. See, e.g., Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 660 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("We can, and should, look to decisions of other signatories when we interpret treaty provisions.
Foreign constructions are evidence of the original shared understanding of the contracting parties.
Moreover, it is reasonable to impute to the parties an intent that their respective courts strive to
interpret the treaty consistently.").
71. See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-80 (2008)
(surveying courts' and analysts' acceptance of the goal of uniformity as desirable without critical
analysis supporting it).
72. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 415
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (proclaiming that the exclusionary rule "is unique to American
jurisprudence"); Craig M. Bradley, Mapp Goes Abroad, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 399 (2001)
("[T]he second component of Mapp has been universally rejected. That is, that once a violation of
search and seizure rules has been found, evidence must be excluded.").
73. See 548 U.S. 331, 343-44 (2006) ("The exclusionary rule as we know it is an entirely
American legal creation[, and i]t is implausible that other signatories to the Convention thought it to
require a remedy that nearly all refuse to recognize as a matter of domestic law.").
74. Id. at 345.
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most other countries provide nothing analogous to the United States' habeas
system.75 American-style habeas is, in fact, an artifact of our federal system
and its distrust of state criminal justice systems after the Civil War. 76 It is

accordingly difficult to speak of uniform treaty interpretation with respect to
procedural default. More generally, treaty cases in domestic courts often
involve the interface between treaty provisions and the domestic legal
system. Since the domestic component of that interface obviously varies
from country to country, nations cannot settle on uniform answers to these
questions.77
Chief Justice Roberts reasoned in Sanchez-Llamas that "[i]f treaties are
to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their
meaning as a matter of federal law 'is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department,' headed by the 'one supreme Court' established by
the Constitution., 78 If there is a case to be made for deference to some other
interpreter, it will have to be made by analogy to forms of deference that do
apply to domestic law.
C. Three Models of Deference in Domestic Law
Justice O'Connor's influential call for a "federalism of free nations"
explicitly invoked not only the "federalist ideal of healthy dialogue and
mutual trust" but also the more specific principles of abstention and interpretive deference that undergird that ideal as models for "the proper relationship
between domestic courts and transnational tribunals., 79 A number of familiar rules require federal courts to defer to other actors-such as state courts
or federal administrative agencies-concerning the interpretation of laws that
are indisputably part of the domestic legal system. The fact that a law is

75. See Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE
L.J. 1143, 1182-83 n.174 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Institutional Settlement] (distinguishing the
American habeas corpus regime from the more limited types of postconviction review or collateral
attack that other legal systems offer, such as the Canadian "miscarriage of justice" standard or the
French and Italian systems, which seem to offer relief only for "errors that go to the actual
innocence of the defendant").
76. See Ira Mickenberg, Abusing the Exceptions and Regulations Clause: Legislative Attempts
to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate Jurisdiction, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 497, 526 (1983)
("Congress had designed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 as a means of enforcing reconstruction
policies by giving blacks and unionist white southerners a federal remedy for unconstitutional
arrests by state officials.").
77. Young, InstitutionalSettlement, supra note 75, at 1236-37.
78. 548 U.S. 331, 353-54 (2006) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)). The Chief Justice also cited Justice Stevens's opinion in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
378-79 (2000)--an opinion rejecting pleas for interpretive deference to state courts on questions of
federal law in habeas cases-for the proposition that "[a]t the core of [the judicial] power is the
federal courts' independent responsibility-independent from its coequal branches in the Federal
Government and independent from the separate authority of the several States-to interpret federal
law." Id. at 354.
79. Sandra Day O'Connor, Federalism ofFree Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN
NATIONAL COURTS 13, 17-18 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996).
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"part of our law," in other words, does not mean that federal courts must
have the last word in interpreting it.
Consider first the interpretive deference federal courts deciding issues
of state law owe to state courts. 80 Under Murdock v. City of Memphis,81 state
supreme courts are supreme when expounding the content of state law. 82 (As
I frequently remind my students, that's why they call them "state supreme
courts.") The U.S. Supreme Court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to review a
state supreme court's interpretation of state law, and in those rare cases in
which protection of federal rights requires such review, the state court's
interpretation is nonetheless entitled to "respectful consideration and great
weight." 83 Likewise, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law
under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 84 and they must defer to the state supreme court as to the meaning of state law. 85 All of this deference, however,
arises from the fact that state law "belongs" to the state courts in a fundamental sense, even though state law is part of the same domestic legal system
as federal law. Indeed, state courts may possess--especially with86regard to
common law matters-broad lawmaking authority under state law.
Treaties do not "belong" to foreign courts or supranational courts in the
way that state law belongs to the state courts. International law, by
definition, is not identified with a particular sovereign. 87 No foreign or
supranational tribunal, therefore, has a greater claim to interpretive authority
over a treaty than do the courts of this country. 88 Unless the United States

80. For a suggestion that domestic courts should apply the same model of deference to ICJ
decisions interpreting the VCCR that federal courts apply to state court interpretations of state law,
see Robert Greffenius, Comment, Selling Medellin: The Entourage of Litigation Surrounding the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Weight of International Court of Justice
Opinions in the Domestic Sphere, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 943, 972-73 (2008).
81. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635-36 (1875).
82. Id. at 635-36.
83. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
85. See, e.g., King v. United Order of Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153, 158 (1948)
("[W]hen the issue confronting a federal court has previously been decided by the highest court in
the appropriate state; the Erie R. Co. case decided that decisions and opinions of that court are
binding on federal courts."); Cent. Union Tel. Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925)
(stating that, even where a federal right turns upon a state court's construction of state law, the
construction "declared by the state court.., should bind [the U.S. Supreme Court] unless so unfair
or unreasonable in its application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it").
86. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 491-94 (1954) (describing the lawmaking authority of the state courts).
87. Cf JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE

STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 140-41 (Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire & Richard Wollheim eds.,
1954) (1832) (arguing that a law imposed by general opinion, such as international law, is not
properly a law because it lacks an institution with power to enforce it).
88. Moreover, the jurisdictional provisions governing many supranational tribunals purport
strictly to limit the impact of those tribunals' decisions to the case before them. See. e.g., Statute of
the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 ("The decision
of the Court has no binding force except as between the parties and in respect of that particular
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has joined a treaty or passed a law that confers interpretive authority to an
international or supranational body, those courts enjoy no greater interpretive
authority than American courts. Moreover, the Supremacy Clause, by making treaties "the supreme Law of the Land," assimilates them to the regime of
federal law.89 Just as federal courts need not defer to state courts concerning
the interpretation of federal statutes, they also need not defer to foreign or
supranational tribunals when interpreting federal treaties.
Another form of deference arises from the delegation of primary
interpretive authority under federal statutes to federal administrative
agencies. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc.,90 courts defer to a federal agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, so long as that interpretation is reasonable. 91 That deference, under
current doctrine, is contingent on a delegation of authority to the agency not
simply to interpret the statute but also to act with the force of law. 92 Some of
Justice Breyer's language in Sanchez-Llamas seemed to suggest a delegation
of this sort: "[T]he ICJ's position as an international court specifically
charged with the duty to interpret numerous international treaties (including
the Convention) provides a natural point of reference for national courts
seeking ... uniformity [of treaty interpretation]." 93 But the ICJ is only one
court among many that must interpret the VCCR. That treaty, if it is to make
any real difference in the thousands of cases each year that potentially arise
under its provisions, must be enforced primarily by domestic courts. 9 4 More
generally, treaties rarely designate a foreign or supranational court as the
primary interpreter of the agreement, much less authorize that court to act
95
with the force of law required for deference under domestic law.
This is not surprising, since none of the traditional domestic checks on
delegated authority are present for foreign or supranational courts. Although

case."); see also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (6th ed. 2003)

("Strictly speaking, the [ICJ] does not observe a doctrine of precedent.").
89. See, e.g., Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 606.
90. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
91. Id. at 843.
92. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001).
93. 548 U.S. 331, 383 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
94. See Ernest A. Young & Carina Cuellar, SupranationalCourts, PresidentialPower, and the
Medellin Case, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 240, 242 (2006) (noting that, aside from enforcement in
domestic courts, "[n]o other mechanism-suits at the ICJ, diplomatic efforts by the sending stateseems suited to deal with the thousands of cases likely to arise [under the VCCR] each year"). The
ICJ, after all, has only heard 144 cases since its inception in 1947, and most of them do not involve
the VCCR. International Court of Justice: Cases, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3.
Moreover, individuals cannot invoke the ICJ's jurisdiction. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993 ("Only States may be parties in cases
before the Court.").
95. See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations art. 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (providing that "recommendations and
rulings of the [World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements").
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the Constitution plainly vests legislative authority in Congress, not in administrative agencies, American administrative law has sought to justify
agencies' exercise of broad lawmaking authority by highlighting a number of
institutional constraints on agency action. These constraints include broad
public participation rights before the agency, 96 congressional oversight 97 and
budgetary control of agencies,98 democratic accountability through the
President, 99 and judicial review for compliance with the agency's statutory
mandate under the Administrative Procedure Act. 00 None of these constraints have good analogs at the supranational level, and the absence of these
constraints makes broad delegations to supranational actors considerably
harder to justify than similar domestic delegations.101
Finally, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 102 represents a lesser form of deference
to agency interpretations of statutes. Under Skidmore, "[t]he weight of [an
agency's] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.' '0 3 Deference in such cases thus rests
not on delegation but on the persuasive quality of the agency's expertise or
its deliberative processes. 10 4 Skidmore deference is thus more broadly available than Chevron but less categorical in its effect.

96. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1748-56 (1975) (indicating that as courts expanded standing rights in agency
proceedings, so too "they have mandated a corresponding expansion of the right to intervene in
agency proceedings").
97. See generally Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165 (1984) (discussing the
ways in which Congress oversees agency action).
98. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in
Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 85 (2008) ("Congress possesses, through its
committee structure and budget oversight, the capacity to engage in... ongoing oversight of agency
implementation of statutes.").
99. See Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331-39 (2001)
(advocating for presidential leadership over administrative agencies that "enhances transparency,
enabling the public to comprehend more accurately the sources and nature of bureaucratic power"
and, secondly, "establishes an electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the
latter's responsiveness to the former").
100. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 143 (1990) ("Broad delegations of power to regulatory agencies, questionable
in light of the grant of legislative power to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, have been
allowed largely on the assumption that courts would be available to ensure agency fidelity to
whatever statutory directives have been issued.").
101. See Edward T. Swaine, The ConstitutionalityofInternationalDelegations, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1492, 1560-66 (2004) [hereinafter Swaine, International Delegation] (identifying special
concerns arising from delegations of authority to supranational institutions).
102. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
103. Id. at 140.
104. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1249 (2007) (noting that Chevron deference rests on a

Treaties as "Part of Our Law"

2009]

It will generally be difficult to make the case, however, that foreign or
supranational courts have any clear entitlement to deference on Skidmore's
criteria. 0 5 In Sanchez-Llamas, for instance, the ICJ is no less a generalist
court than is the U.S. Supreme Court; it hears disputes concerning a wide
variety of international law principles, and VCCR cases make up a small
proportion of its docket. 0 6 It would be difficult, moreover, to defend the
ICJ's deliberative processes as plainly superior to those of the domestic
courts. 10 7

In certain circumstances-if, for example, a particular foreign

court has extensive experience with a particular type of claim or issue arising
under a particular treaty-a Skidmore-type rationale may favor some degree
of deference to a foreign or supranational tribunal. But this model hardly
affords a basis for any sort of broad or categorical deference to such courts in
treaty cases.
These examples do not exhaust the situations in which federal courts
may defer to other actors' interpretations of domestic law.' 0 8 They ought to
suffice to illustrate my fundamental point, however, that the usual reasons for
deference evaporate when treaties are not considered to be mysterious or
alien, but rather part of our law. Chief Justice Roberts was thus correct to
say, in Sanchez-Llamas, that if "treaties are to be given effect as federal law
under our legal system," then American courts must be willing "'to 09say what
the law is"' without deference to foreign or supranational tribunals.'
II.

Self-Execution

Not long after its decision in Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court
addressed an even more fundamental question concerning the domestic status
of treaties-that is, when treaties should be considered self-executing within
the domestic legal system. The self-execution issue is typically traced to

"presumption that Congress chose an agency rather than the courts to be the primary interpreter of a
given statutory scheme," while Skidmore deference "merely reflects a policy ofjudicial prudence").
105. See Young, InstitutionalSettlement, supra note 75, at 1243-48 (discussing the institutional
competence of supranational courts).
106. See John R. Crook,
The International Court of Justice and Human
Rights, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 2, 2-3 (2003) ("There have been a few ICJ ... decisions
significantly contributing to human rights law, but historically they have been a small part of the
docket.").
107. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the InternationalCourt ofJustice
Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 618-26 (2005) (finding bias by ICJ judges in favor of their home
state and similarly situated states).
108. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (illustrating the Court's deference to
a federal agency's interpretation of its own regulations).
109. 548 U.S. 331, 353-54 (2006) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)); see also Paulsen, supra note 28, at 1796 ("Sanchez-Llamas and [Medellin] stand for the
proposition that the constitutional power to interpret international treaties to which the United States
is a party is a domestic U.S. constitutional power to be exercised by U.S. constitutional actors
(including the federal courts), and that such a power can never be deemed ceded to non-U.S. actors
or institutions.").
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Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Foster v. Neilson,'10 which said that because a treaty is "the law of the land" under the Supremacy Clause, it must
"be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. '
Marshall added, however, that "when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the
treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court."'1 2

American law thus occupies an uncomfortable middle ground

between the theoretical extremes of "monism" and "dualism"; 1 3 sometimes
treaties have direct effect within the domestic legal system, and sometimes
they must be implemented by the political branches. Almost two centuries
after Foster, there is little consensus about how to approach these
questions. 114
The Supreme Court confronted the self-execution issue most recently in
Medellin v. Texas11 5-another case involving the effect of the ICJ's judgment
in the Avena case on domestic litigation under the VCCR." 6 Medellin held
that the Avena judgment was not self-executing and, therefore, did not bind
either the Texas courts or the Supreme Court in the absence of domestic legislation implementing that judgment.' 7 Because it involved the selfexecuting effect of a judgment rather than a treaty and because the Court did
not offer any hard-and-fast rules concerning the self-execution question,
Medellin did not answer the self-execution question nearly so definitively as
Sanchez-Llamas answered the question of interpretive deference.

110. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
111. Id. at 314.
112. Id. Professor Vdzquez has argued that the Marshall Court overruled Foster just four years
later in United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88-89 (1833), which held the same treaty
involved in Foster self-executing in different circumstances. Vhzquez, Treaties as the Law of the
Land, supra note 4, at 628, 644-45. As Professor Bradley points out, however, Percheman is
distinguishable from Foster on the important ground that, in the latter case, the treaty provision in
question "did not pose a potential conflict with preexisting statutes." Bradley, Self-Execution, supra
note 26, at 162.
113. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-32 (7th ed.
2008); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51
STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley, Our Dualist Constitution] (both defining
"monism" and "dualism"). It bears emphasis that each nation's choice of how to implement its
international obligations is a question of domestic law. See Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26,
at 157 ("Although this decision may have international consequences, it does not typically involve
an international bargain, and it is not determined by international law.").
114. See Bradley, Our Dualist Constitution,supra note 113, at 530-31 (explaining that the two
basic viewpoints concerning the relationship between international and domestic law are monism
and dualism, and although dualism was the prevailing view throughout the second half of the
twentieth century, there has been a revival of monist thought); Wu, supra note 3, at 579 ("[S]elfexecution problems are universally regarded as both confusing and confused.").
115. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
116. Id. at 1352-53.
117. Id. at 1373-74.
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Nonetheless, I want to argue that the general thrust of Medellin-that nothing
in the Constitution requires that treaties be self-executing and the matter is
one of interpreting the intent of the treaty makers under any given
agreement-is correct.
A.

The Debate About Self-Execution

The leading foreign-relations-law casebook defines a self-executing
treaty "at the most general level" as "a treaty that can be enforced by courts
without domestic implementing legislation." ' 18 As Carlos Vdzquez has
shown, however, "self-execution" really encompasses a category of distinct
questions concerning a treaty's domestic legal effect." 9 The latest version of
Professor Vdzquez's account defines the following four categories of nonself-executing treaties:
120
* "treaties that do not create a private right of action";
* "treaties that purport to accomplish something for which the
Constitution requires a statute";' 21
*

"treaties that impose obligations that are nonjusticiable because
they call for judgments of a nonjudicial nature"; 122 and
* Foster v. Neilson non-self-execution-that is, "treaties that
require prior implementation because of what the treaty itself has
'' 23
to say about the need for legislative implementation.
The first of these categories-no private right of action-is not
necessarily a doctrine of non-self-execution at all because it leaves open the
possibility that a court could enforce the treaty in some other ways. These
alternative mechanisms might include recognizing a defense based on the
treaty or allowing a plaintiff to assert treaty rights offensively where some
other vehicle (such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983) provides the private right of
action. 24 As these mechanisms make clear, the private-right-of-action issue
is simply one of a variety of remedial questions that must be addressed under
each treaty, even if that treaty is self-executing in some sense. In many
cases, these sorts of specific remedial questions may be considerably more

118. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND

MATERIALS 377 (2d ed. 2006).
119. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995) [hereinafter Vdzquez, Four Doctrines] (proposing that there are four
distinct doctrines of self-executing treaties).
120. Vhzquez, Treatiesas the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 629.
121. Id. at 630.
122. Id. at 631.
123. Id. at 628-29, 631-32.
124. Id. at 630.
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salient than the general issue of whether the treaty has any self-executing
25
effect. "'

Professor Vdzquez's second category describes treaties calling for
actions-such as appropriating funds or imposing criminal penalties-that
only Congress can perform under our Constitution. 26 The third is a doctrine
of nonjusticiability similar to the domestic political question doctrine, which
forecloses judicial enforcement of constitutional provisions when there is "a

lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" or a court cannot
decide "without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion."' 127
And the fourth is "primarily a matter of
intent" 28-that is, the parties (or perhaps the U.S. treaty makers
unilaterally) 129 can require legislative implementation before a treaty has
domestic legal effect if they so choose. According to
Vdzquez, only this
' 30

fourth sort of non-self-execution "is unique to treaties."'

At the risk of complicating matters further, I think we can be still more
specific about the ways in which a treaty might be non-self-executing in the
Fostersense. The initial two categories have to do with the nature of the obligations the treaty imposes. First, the treaty's provisions may be so openended or vague as to suggest that the parties intended the treaty (or portions
thereof) to be hortatory or aspirational. A number of multilateral human
rights instruments have this quality.' 31 U.S. treaty makers have often appended reservations or declarations to treaties explicitly denying them selfexecuting effect,' 32 but treaties have been held non-self-executing even in the

absence of such measures.'

33

Second, a treaty may contemplate specific ac-

125. In this vein, Mr. Sanchez-Llamas's argument for exclusion of evidence as a remedy for
violation of a defendant's VCCR rights posed a more specialized remedial question. See supra
notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
126. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 630.
127. Id. at 631 (quoting Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
128. Vdzquez, Four Doctrines,supra note 119, at 722.
129. Scholars have debated whether the relevant intent for American courts construing a treaty
under Foster is that of the signatory nations or of the U.S. treaty makers only. Compare, e.g.,
Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26, at 132 (arguing that courts should focus on the intent of the
U.S. treaty makers), with Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 640 (rejecting
the view that only U.S. intent counts). For the remainder of this Section, I want to bracket that
debate and refer simply to the parties for reasons of word economy.
130. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 632.
131. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 n.4 (7th Cir.
1985) (finding Article 55 of the UN Charter, commanding "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms," non-self-executing on this ground).
132. See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-selfexecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129, 131 (1999)
(describing the United States' inclusion of "not self-executing" declarations in the ratification
instruments of three recent, major human rights treaties).
133. See, e.g., Goldstar (Pan.) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the Hague Convention is not self-executing because the document does not evidence
an intent to provide a private right of action); Frolova, 761 F.2d at 374 (giving reasons that the UN
Charter is not self-executing); Bradley, Our Dualist Constitution, supra note 113, at 540-41
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tion by national governments to implement its terms, much as a regulatory
statute might direct an administrative agency to address a particular problem
but leave development of the operative regulations to the agency. In these
circumstances, the treaty is simply a directive to legislate at the domestic
level.
The other two categories go to remedies. In the third category, a treaty
may impose obligations that bind domestic actors without further action by
domestic governments but leave enforcement of those obligations to
alternative, nonjudicial mechanisms. In Medellin, for example, the Court
held that ICJ judgments are not directly enforceable in domestic courts in
part because the UN Charter provides a different procedural mechanism for
their enforcement by the Security Council. 134 Finally, a treaty may not
envision some specific alternative enforcement mechanism but instead rely
"on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If
these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and
reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may
in the end be enforced by actual war."' 35 In'' 36such cases, "the judicial courts
have nothing to do and can give no redress."
The multiplicity of questions marching under the banner of non-selfexecution makes it difficult to talk about the issue in any sort of general way.
Nonetheless, I think it might be fair to sum up the current debate roughly in
the following manner: Everyone agrees there are some things the treaty makers must leave to Congress (Professor Vdizquez's second category), and most
thoughtful observers recognize that remedial questions like the availability of
a private right of action (the first category) will remain even if a treaty is
found to be self-executing generally. Vdzquez's third and fourth categories
(nonjusticiability and Foster non-self-execution) are then commonly lumped
together for purposes of arguing about whether treaties should generally, or
presumptively, be considered self-executing or non-self-executing. I do not
mean to quarrel overmuch with this sort of rough cut at the question,
although I do think that disaggregating nonjusticiability and the various
forms of Foster non-self-execution can help us to identify analogous phenomena in domestic law.
The argument that treaties should generally-or always-be treated as
self-executing purports to derive straightforwardly from the Supremacy

(explaining that U.S. treaty makers often attach the condition that the treaty is not self-executing;
even without such an express statement, courts essentially presume treaties are not self-executing).
134. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1359 (2008) ("The remainder of Article 94 confirms
that the U.N. Charter does not contemplate the automatic enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic
courts. Article 94(2)-the enforcement provision-provides the sole remedy for noncompliance:
referral to the United Nations Security Council by an aggrieved state.").
135. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884).
136. Id.
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Clause. 137 That clause explicitly incorporates treaties into domestic law, and
the relevant history strongly suggests that this language was a deliberate attempt to depart from the British rule, which held that a treaty could not alter
domestic law without action by Parliament. 138 One of the principal defects of
the Articles of Confederation had been its lack of a mechanism for
guaranteeing the enforcement of international agreements, such as the Treaty
of Paris that ended the Revolutionary War. 39 According to Professor
Vdzquez, "The Founders were anxious to avoid treaty violations because
such violations threatened to provoke wars and otherwise complicate relations with more powerful nations. The Founders also wanted to establish a
reputation for treaty compliance to induce other nations to conclude beneficial treaties with the new nation."'' 40 Vdzquez argues that the Supremacy
Clause furthered these goals by rendering treaties "enforceable in court without the need 1for
prior legislative implementation or incorporation into
41
domestic law.'

This history is not undisputed, 142 and one may question more
fundamentally the extent to which originalist materials should dominate
contemporary debates about foreign relations law, given the many radical
changes in both the nature of international law and the United States' place in
the world since the founding. 143 For the most part, however, I want to side-

137. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988)
("The distinction found in certain cases between 'self-executing' and 'non-self-executing' treaties is
a judicially invented notion that is patently inconsistent with express language in the Constitution
affirming that 'all Treaties... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."').
138. Vfzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 614-16. The British rule
appears to have originated in the fact that treaty making was part of the Crown's prerogative power,
but the power to alter domestic law remained vested in Parliament. Id. at 614 (quoting 14 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 67 (1964)).
139. See BRADFORD PERKINS, THE CREATION OF A REPUBLICAN EMPIRE, 1776-1865, at 61
(1993) (observing that under the Articles of Confederation state action on occasion contradicted
treaties and these violations served as an impetus to the reform movement).
140. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 617-18; see also Carlos
Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1102-03
(1992) (recounting the framers' concerns about treaty compliance).
141. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 618. But see Bradley, SelfExecution, supra note 26, at 146-47 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause was oriented toward the
federalism problem of ensuring state compliance with treaties, not toward the separation-of-powers
problem of self-execution).
142. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-self-execution, and
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1955 (1999) (arguing that the framers
believed the Constitution required the consent of Congress before treaties could have any domestic
effect).
143. See, e.g., Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26, at 131-32 (questioning originalism's
ability to address contemporary issues, such as legislative-style multilateral treaties, which were not
contemplated by the founders); Ernest A. Young, HistoricalPracticeand the ContemporaryDebate
over Customary International Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31, 35-39 (2009),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/3 1_Young.pdf
[hereinafter
Young,
Historical Practice] (noting that changes in the United States's status as an international actor,
increases in the amount and complexity of international relations, and growing complexity in
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step each of these debates here. Accepting that the Supremacy Clause
requires courts to treat treaties similarly to federal statutes, I argue here that
internationalist conclusions on self-execution do not follow. Supreme federal law in the domestic context actually takes a variety of forms: some
statutes create judicially enforceable rights, but some do not; some judicially
enforceable rights may be enforced by private rights of action, but some may
not; some statutes are simply contracts between the states and the federal
government, the performance of which are governed largely by politics and
the good faith of the parties. This multifarious view of supreme federal law
mirrors, in important respects, the various approaches to particular treaties
that result from rejecting a blanket view of self-execution. The idea that
some treaties are not self-executing, in other words, is wholly consistent with
the notion that treaties are "part of our law."
B. Medellin, SupranationalJudgments, and the Treaty Debate
The VCCR claim in Medellin was similar to that raised by Mr.
Bustillo in Sanchez-Llamas. Jos6 Ernesto Medellin was a Mexican national
who had lived in the United States since the age of three. 44 In 1993,
Mr. Medellin participated in the brutal gang rape and murder of two teenage
girls in Houston. 45 Medellin later confessed to having strangled one of the
two girls with her own shoelaces. 146 He was convicted of capital murder in
Texas state court and sentenced to die,and the Texas courts affirmed both the
conviction and sentence on direct review. 147 Not until his first application for
state postconviction relief did Medellin raise the objection that the Houston
police had failed to notify him of his rights under the VCCR. 148 Medellin's
claim thus faced the same procedural default obstacle that derailed Bustillo's
claim in Sanchez-Llamas; like Bustillo, moreover, Medellin invoked the
49
ICJ's ruling in Avena that the VCCR trumps state procedural default rules.1
Unlike Mr. Bustillo, however, Mr. Medellin was one of the fifty-one
Mexican nationals encompassed by the Avena ruling.150 Medellin was thus at
least arguably entitled to invoke Avena, not simply as a possibly authoritative

international law limit the usefulness of historical perspectives in evaluating current international
law).
144. Medellin Execution Draws Little Attention in Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 6,
2008, availableat http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/mexico/stories/
080608dnintmedellinmexico. 1df0681e.html.
145. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1354 (2008).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1356.
150. Id. at 1350.
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construction of the VCCR by the ICJ, but as a judgment in a case to which he
and the United States were both parties.15 1 As Justice Breyer explained,
This Court's Sanchez-Llamas interpretation binds our courts with
respect to individuals whose rights were not espoused by a state party
inAvena.... [T]he question here is the very different question of

applying the ICJ's Avena judgment to the very parties whose interests
Mexico and the United States espoused in the ICJ Avena
proceeding. 152
When a party to a prior decision seeks to invoke the judgment against
another party, of course, it is generally no defense to say that the prior
decision was wrong on the merits.153 The principal question in Medellin was
thus whether the Court would accord more deference to the judgment force
54
of Avena than Sanchez-Llamas accorded to that case's precedentialforce.
Given this posture, Medellin did not raise directly the question whether
the VCCR itself is self-executing. 155 Most observers have assumed that it is,
in the sense that the treaty bound the Houston police to provide consular notification to Mr. Medellin even in the absence of a statute implementing the
VCCR's obligations on host countries. 156 The Executive Branch said as
much when it transmitted the VCCR to the Senate for ratification in 1969,
declaring that the treaty was "entirely self-executing and does not require any

15 1. The majority and dissent sparred over this point. Chief Justice Roberts invoked the terms
of the ICJ's statute, which provide that only states may be parties before the ICJ, Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1059, T.S. No. 993, to
conclude that "Medellin does not and cannot have a case before the ICJ under the terms of the ICJ
Statute," Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1360 n.7. In response, Justice Breyer noted that claims such as
Mexico's before the ICJ, which espouse the claims of particular individuals, "are a well-established
feature of international law" and "treated.. .as the claims of the represented individuals
themselves." Id. at 1387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "In particular, they can give rise to remedies,
tailored to the individual, that bind the Nation against whom the claims are brought." Id. (citing 2
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 713 cmt. a-b
(1987)). Justice Breyer is certainly right that Mr. Medellin was no stranger to the ICJ litigation in
the way that a nonparty would generally be to an ordinary domestic civil suit. But the sources
Justice Breyer cited hardly establish the proposition that an individual may invoke as binding, in a
domestic court, a judgment secured on his behalf by his government in a supranational suit against
another nation. In any event, the majority did not treat this point as crucial.
152. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1386 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. See, e.g., 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106 (1971) ("A judgment
will be recognized and enforced in other states even though an error of fact or law was made in the
").
proceedings before judgment ....
154. See generally Young, Judgments and Precedents, supra note 65, at 489-91 (discussing
Medellin).
155. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.4 (reserving this question).
156. See, e.g., Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 686 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,dissenting)
("Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is, as the United States recognizes, a
self-executing treaty."). This is the view of the Houston police. See Houston Police Dep't, Circular
No. 06-0821-246, Aug. 21, 2006 (on file with Texas Law Review) (stating that federal and state
decisions limiting the enforceability of VCCR rights "do not relieve government entities of their
duty to comply with the treaty").
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implementing or complementing legislation."'1 57 It is less clear whether the
VCCR confers rights on individuals that are directly enforceable by them in
domestic courts. 158
The Court assumed in both Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellin that the VCCR does confer such rights, but the Supreme Court did
59
not actually decide that question and the federal circuit courts are divided. 1
The issue in Medellin, by contrast, concerned whether the ICJ's
judgment in Avena, which restricted the effect of procedural defaults in

VCCR cases, was self-executing in the absence of direction from Congress
as to the effects of ICJ judgments. As Chief Justice Roberts put it, "The
question is whether the Avena judgment has binding effect in domestic courts
under the Optional Protocol, ICJ Statute, and U.N. Charter."' 160 These three
sources-all treaties of the United States-provide the procedural framework
for resolving disputes under the VCCR. The Optional Protocol provides that
"[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna]
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice."' 6' Article 94 of the United Nations Charter, in turn, says
that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.' 62 And the ICJ
Statute further provides that a "decision of the [ICJ] has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.' 63

157. S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app. at 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly, Deputy Legal
Adviser for Administration, U.S. Dep't of State).
158. See, e.g., Young & Cuellar, supra note 94, at 241-42 (surveying this issue).
159. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.4 (noting that it was unnecessary to resolve whether the
Vienna Convention is itself "self-executing" or whether it grants individually enforceable rights but
stating that the Court would assume that Article 36 of the VCCR grants foreign nationals an
individually enforceable right); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 342-43 (2006) (stating
that for the purposes of addressing the petitioners' claims, the Court would assume, without
deciding, that Article 36 of the VCCR does confer individually enforceable rights). Compare, e.g.,
United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 886 (8th Cir. 2002) (assuming an individually enforceable
right under the VCCR to deny a remedy sought-restriction on the range of penalties available to
federal prosecutors), with Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying
standing to individuals to challenge violations of international treaties without the involvement of
their sovereigns). For criticism of the Court's failure to decide whether the VCCR creates
individually enforceable rights in Sanchez-Llamas, see The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Leading
Cases, 120 HARv. L. REv. 125, 310-12 (2006). The circuits are also divided as to whether foreign
nationals may bring a VCCR claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Compare, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 480
F.3d 822, 826-28 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that they can), with Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504
F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that they cannot).
160. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357 n.4.
161. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, art. I, Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487. Only 44 of the 170 states that are party to the VCCR itself
are also parties to the Optional Protocol. Young, Judgments and Precedent, supra note 65, at 487
n.44. The U.S. withdrew from the Optional Protocol in the wake of the Avena decision. See supra
note 55.
162. U.N. Charter art. 94, para.1.
163. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1062,
T.S. No. 993.
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The straightforward Supremacy Clause argument for self-execution of
treaties is plainly unavailable for judgments, which that Clause does not
mention. 164 Within the domestic legal system, judgments are rendered65
effective by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its accompanying statute,1
not by the Supremacy Clause. And as the Medellin majority pointed out,
Congress has frequently enacted legislation specifying the effects of judgments rendered by supranational and foreign courts. 166 The Court cited, for
example, explicit federal legislation rendering judgments under the
International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the
UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards enforceable in domestic courts. 167 It could also have cited legislation

implementing the World Trade Organization (WTO) and North American
Free Trade Agreements, which both provide procedures for enforcing arbitral
awards rendered under those agreements and sharply limit the extent to
which those decisions can directly affect domestic law.' 68 Absent an implementing statute, the Court concluded that "while the ICJ's judgment in Avena
creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it
does not of its own force constitute binding federal law169that preempts state
restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions."'

164. One might have argued that American courts were obligated to respect the Avena
judgment as a matter of international comity rather than relying on the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g.,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agora: Breard: Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 709 (1998)
("[I]nternational comity dictates that American courts enforce these sorts of clauses out of respect
for the integrity and competence of foreign tribunals."). Neither the majority nor the dissent in
Medellin relied on this argument, and Paul Stephan has explained why it does not fly: Comity is
based on reciprocity, and reciprocity can exist only among States. Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 17-20 (2009). Domestic courts thus have no reciprocal obligations of
comity toward stateless international organizations like the ICJ. Id.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof."); Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2006)) ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such
State ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ...as they

have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.").
166. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1365-66 (2008).
167. Id. at 1366 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 1650a(a) (2006); 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (2006)). On the
binding effects of foreign arbitral awards, see generally Young, Judgments and Precedents, supra
note 65, at 480-84, 512-13.
168. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 3512(a)(l) (2000) ("No provision of any of the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application
of any such provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United
States shall have effect."); id. § 3512(c)(1)(B) (prohibiting challenges to government conduct on the
ground that the conduct violates WTO obligations); NAFTA, 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2) (2000) ("No
State law, or the application thereof, may be declared invalid as to any person or circumstance on
the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with the Agreement, except in an action
brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application invalid.").
169. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1367.
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Although the Court's conclusion in Medellin is best understood as a
holding that the Avena judgment itself was not self-executing, one might
alternatively think of the case as implicating the self-executing effects of the
underlying treaties-not the obligations of the VCCR itself, but rather the
dispute-resolution provisions of the Optional Protocol and, more directly,
Article 94 of the UN Charter.1 70 The key question of treaty construction was
thus what the parties to the Charter meant by saying that each Member of the
UN "undertakes to comply" with ICJ judgments. The majority read this language not to confer self-executing force on the ICJ's judgments for three
reasons: first, the treaty lacked any language indicating that ICJ judgments
would have that effect; 171 second, the Executive's position that Article 94 did
not have that effect was "entitled to great weight";' 72 and third, "[t]he UN
Charter's provision of an express diplomatic-that is, nonjudicial-remedy
is itself evidence1 73
that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in
domestic courts."

Justice Breyer's dissent in Medellin, as well as much of the commentary
on the case, focused on the first of these arguments at the expense of the
other two. Because different legal systems have quite different approaches to
the self-execution question-that is, some are monist, some are dualist, and
some occupy intermediate positions-Justice Breyer suggested that it would
be unrealistic to expect state parties to multilateral instruments like the
174
VCCR to agree on explicit language specifying a treaty's domestic effect.
Hence, Breyer concluded,
[T]he absence or presence of language in a treaty about a
provision's self-execution proves nothing at all. At best the Court

170. See id. at 1358 ("The obligation on the part of signatory nations to comply with ICJ
judgments derives not from the Optional Protocol, but rather from Article 94 of the United Nations
Charter-the provision that specifically addresses the effect of ICJ decisions.").
171. See id. at 1358-59 (stating that Article 94 lacks language indicating that the United States
"shall" or "must" comply with ICJ decisions, does not require the U.S. Senate to give ICJ decisions
immediate legal effect in U.S. courts upon ratification of the UN Charter, and only provides a
nonjudical remedy for aggrieved states, referral to the UN Security Council); see also id. at 1373
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("In my view, the words 'undertakes to comply'-while
not the model of either a self-executing or a non-self-executing commitment-are most naturally
read as a promise to take additional steps to enforce ICJ judgments.").
172. See id. at 1361 (majority opinion) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457
U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)) (holding that the United States' interpretation of a treaty is "entitled to
great weight").
173. Id. at 1359. This argument was predicated on Article 94 of the Charter, which provides,
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
174. Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1381 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Vdzquez, Treatiesas the Law
of the Land, supra note 4, at 607 ("Domestic constitutional rules on treaty enforcement ... differ
widely among states. Thus, except in the rarest of cases, courts searching for a common intent of
the parties regarding the need for implementing legislation do so in vain.").
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is hunting the snark. At worst it erects legalistic hurdles that can
threaten the application of provisions in many existing commercial
and other treaties and make it more difficult to negotiate new
ones. 175
Rather than look to the language of the treaty itself, Justice Breyer
proposed an open-ended analysis based on "practical, context-specific
criteria" to answer the self-execution question.' 76 And he gave short shrift to
the majority's remaining arguments. Breyer largely ignored the majority's
deference to the President's determination that ICJ judgments are not selfexecuting, in contrast to Breyer's apparent willingness to accord the
President broad authority to implement international obligations without
congressional action.' 77 And Breyer found the existence of an alternative178
dispute-resolution procedure at the Security Council wholly irrelevant,
notwithstanding an established line of cases on the domestic side inferring
that specific dispute mechanisms under a statute impliedly exclude recourse
to more general rights of action like Bivens 179 or § 1983.18°
Some commentators have read Medellin as establishing a presumption
that treaties are not self-executing.' 81 I think this rather drastically overreads
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion, which I take to stand for the simple proposition that "some treaties are self-executing and some are not, depending on the

175. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Bradley, Self-Execution,
supra note 26, at 21 ("Treaty text is relevant [toself-execution] because it is what the Senate and
President specifically approve .... This is true ... regardless of whether the treaty text would
mean something different to other treaty parties on this question of self-execution ....
").
176. Compare Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1382-83 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (looking to factors such
as the treaty's text, history, and subject matter, to whether it set forth "specific, detailed individual
legal rights," and to the likelihood of "undesirable conflict with the other branches"), with id. at
1362 (majority opinion) (calling the dissent's approach "arrestingly indeterminate" and warning that
it would allow courts to "pick and choose which [treaties] shall be binding United States law").
177. See id. at 1390 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to believe that in the exercise of his
Article I1powers pursuant to a ratified treaty, the President can never take action that would result
in setting aside state law."). Justice Breyer also joined majority opinions deferring to executive
foreign affairs powers in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), and
American InsuranceAss'n v. Garamendi,539 U.S. 396 (2003).
178. See id. at 1385 ("But what has that to do with the matter?"). Justice Breyer suggested that
the Security Council procedure should be reserved for "politically significant ICJ decisions, not,
e.g., the bread-and-butter commercial and other matters that are the typical subjects of selfexecuting treaty provisions." Id. Breyer did not explain why he thought overturning a capital
murder conviction in a high-profile case was not "politically significant."
179. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
375-76, 390 (1983) (both holding that no implied right of action under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is available where Congress
has provided an alternative statutory remedial scheme).
180. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
14-15 (1981) (holding that plaintiffs could not sue under § 1983 for federal statutory violations
where the specific statutes involved provided their own mechanisms for relief).
181. See, e.g., Posting of Mike Doff to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2008/03/moremedellin-musings.html (Mar. 26, 2008, 13:33 EST) (reading Medellin to establish a "presumption
that, absent language to the contrary, a treaty should be deemed non-self-executing").
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treaty." 182 The anti-self-execution reading relies heavily on the Court's
directive to look to the treaty's text, coupled with the expectation-voiced by
Justice Breyer-that treaty text almost never says anything useful about the
question. By requiring evidence of self-execution that almost never exists,
the argument goes, the Court has effectively guaranteed that courts will find
many or most treaties are non-self-executing. 83 But this reading ignores the
importance that the majority attached to the Executive's interpretation of the
treaty and to the treaty's structure-that is, to its provision of an alternate
remedial scheme outside the realm of judicial enforcement.
More generally, the Court's decision was likely driven by the
extraordinary nature of what Mr. Medellin asked the Court to do. The
question before the Court was not simply whether a particular substantive
treaty provision was self-executing, but rather whether the relevant treaties
empowered the ICJ-a supranational court-to make law that would become
binding domestically without further intervention by the national political
branches.8 4 As Curt Bradley has noted, U.S. treaties generally do not
"purport to convert the decisions and actions of international institutions into
self-executing federal law."' 85 Medellin interpreted the VCCR and its
Optional Protocol to be consistent with this pattern.
An important objection to this view proceeds by analogy to domestic
statutes delegating lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies.
Ed Swaine points out that "if the treaties in question do not themselves give
domestic legal force to the delegated actions ... then international delegations are qualitatively different from domestic delegations, since legislative
' 86
authority exercised by executive agencies typically does have legal force."'
The Supreme Court has acknowledged, for example, that "[f]ederal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes,"' 187 even though
the Supremacy Clause speaks only of "the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution-not of actions by adminis-

182. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1365; accord Posting of Nick Rosenkranz to The Federalist Society
Ongoing Debate Series: Medellin v. Texas, Part I: Self-Execution, http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/
dbtid.17/default.asp (Mar. 28, 2008) ("[l]t is noteworthy that none of the Justices (expressly)
resorted to a presumption to resolve this question [of self-execution].").
183. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (lamenting that almost no
treaties-including those held to be self-executing--contain direct textual cues saying that they are
self-executing).
184. Moreover, Mr. Medellin asked the Court to so hold in a case where the particular law
being made by the ICJ had already been rejected by one of the Court's decisions not two years
before. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006) (declaring that default state
procedural rules must be followed despite an inconsistent result with the ICJ's interpretation of
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention).
185. Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-selfexecution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1589 (2003).
186. Swaine, InternationalDelegations, supra note 101, at 1553.
187. Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De laCuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
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trative agencies. 8 8 If this analogy holds, then perhaps the works of
supranational institutions exercising delegated authority-perhaps including
the ICJ's judgments-should be accorded the status of supreme federal law.
The Court has never explained, however, why it is appropriate to treat
administrative agency actions as equivalent to federal statutes, even though

the Supremacy Clause mentions the latter but not the former. Moreover, the
Court has continued to insist that real lawmaking power cannot be
delegated, 189 and even in administrative preemption cases, the Court has
generally kept its focus squarely on Congress's actions and Congress's
intent. 190 In any event, the analogy does not hold; supranational delegations

are far more problematic, and consequently much more limited and rare, than
domestic ones.191
As I have already mentioned, Congress has ample
mechanisms for supervising and checking administrative agency action that
simply do not exist with respect to supranational courts.1 9 2 The lack of
checks makes it singularly inappropriate to treat a supranational judgment as
equivalent, for Supremacy Clause purposes, to the act of the treaty makers
themselves.

Medellin was an unusual case, and it seems risky to draw from it a
categorical rule that self-execution either is or is not presumptively favored
in treaty cases. 193 But given the increasing pervasiveness of treaty law,' 94 as

188. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
189. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001) (re-emphasizing
that Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution precludes the delegation of lawmaking powers).
190. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan, 458 U.S. at 152-54 (discussing the modes of analysis used to
determine congressional intent in preemptive legislation); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin &
Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57
DUKE L.J. 2111, 2133-35 (2008) (concluding that the preemptive effect of an administrative
regulation depends on Congress's intent).
191. See Stephan, supra note 164, at 14 ("[A]s a practical matter, we have yet to encounter a
pure delegation by the United States of legislative or executive power to an international
organization.").
192. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
193. Professor Vdzquez argues that Medellin is best read as recognizing-or at least
accepting-a presumption favoring self-execution. Vdzquez offers a whole range of interpretations
of the Court's opinion, one of which would "embrac[e] a default rule of self-execution rebuttable by
evidence of an intent to require implementing legislation." Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the
Land, supra note 4, at 657. This reading rests on an idiosyncratic reading of the Court's
Youngstown analysis, and Vhzquez admits that Medellin's "tone and much of its analysis point the
other way." Id. He also offers a somewhat more plausible reading of Medellin as an instance of
nonjusticiability because "Article 94 left the parties to the Charter ... with some discretion not to
comply," and this discretion was nonjudicial in nature. Id. at 660. If this is the case, Vfzquez
contends, then Medellin would represent an entirely distinct form of non-self-execution from that
involved in Foster and Percheman and would not disturb the general presumption in favor of selfexecution that he finds in those cases. Id. at 608, 660-65. This reading, too, seems strained. As the
overwhelming majority of commentators have concluded, the Medellin opinion is hardly friendly to
self-execution, even if it did not adopt a presumption the other way.
194. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 1 (1995) (observing the number

of ways in which international agreements have become more complex).
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well as the general utility of default rules for interpreting ambiguous texts,195
it seems likely that the Court will have to return to the self-execution question sooner rather than later. I address the more general debate about
whether the Supremacy Clause generally requires self-execution in the next
section.
C. Self-Execution, Supremacy, and Equivalent Treatment
All participants in the self-execution debate seem to accept one obvious
set of counterexamples to the proposition that the Supremacy Clause requires
all treaties to be self-executing. Because Article I provides that "No Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law,' 96 commentators agree that "any financial undertaking by the
United States... requires implementation by appropriation from
Congress.' 97 Most likewise concede that imposing criminal penalties
requires congressional action,' 98 and both Congress and the Executive have
99
taken the view that a self-executing treaty cannot take the country to war.'
The Supremacy Clause thus does not foreclose non-self-executing treaties in
these areas. Nor does it help to say that these exceptions are constitutionally
required: The point is simply that a treaty requiring the expenditure of funds
or imposition of a criminal penalty is no less a treaty under the Supremacy
Clause-no less a part of supreme federal law-than any other treaty. Selfexecution, then, cannot be a sine qua non of the supreme law of the land.
These constitutionally prescribed categories of non-self-execution point
toward a more fundamental conceptual difficulty in the internationalist
position. That position is generally framed as deriving directly from the
Supremacy Clause's categorical language: "all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land . ,200 And yet few commentators actually say that all treaties

195. See, e.g., EfNER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR

LEGISLATION 20-22 (2008) (developing a theory of statutory default rules).
196. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.7.
197. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 203.
198. Id. According to Professor Henkin, this requirement is tied to the settled proposition that
there is no federal common law of crimes. Id. at 479 n.105. In United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, the Court declared that before there can be a federal criminal prosecution, "[t]he
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and
declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
199. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 203 (citing Documents Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty:
Hearing on the North Atlantic Treaty Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong. 11
(1949) (statement of Dean Acheson, Sec'y of State of the U.S.) ("Under our Constitution, the
Congress alone has the power to declare war.")); see also War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No.93148, 87 Stat. 558 (1973) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (2006)) (seeking to foreclose
the implication from any treaty provision of authorization to use military force).
200. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 4, at 2095
(noting that the text of the Supremacy Clause makes treaties self-executing upon ratification);
Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 614 (arguing that the "bare text of [the
Supremacy Clause] establishes that treaties are to be given effect by judges").
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must be self-executing; instead, they argue for the more modest proposition
that treaties are presumptively self-executing. Louis Henkin, for example,
states the position as follows:
What seems clear, from the language of the Constitution and of John
Marshall, is that in the United States the strong presumption should be
that a treaty or a treaty provision is self-executing, and that a non-selfexecuting promise is highly exceptional. A tendency in the Executive
branch and in the courts to interpret treaties and treaty provisions as
the language, and spirit, and history
non-self-executing runs counter to
20
of Article VI of the Constitution. 1
The problem is that Article VI's categorical language does not speak in terms
of presumptions-even strong ones. If treating a treaty as non-self-executing
"runs counter to the language, and spirit, and history ' 20 2 of the Supremacy
Clause, then that treatment is unconstitutional, even if it only happens in a
small fraction of the cases.
The alternative, however, is to admit that self-execution is not inherent
in supremacy. Both Professors Henkin and Vdzquez do admit this possibility
when they acknowledge the exception that Chief Justice Marshall recognized
in Foster v. Neilson-that is, that sometimes a treaty "addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court., 20 3 Henkin says simply
that "Marshall ...felt obliged to read an exception into the Supremacy
Clause. 20 4 If that was what the great Chief Justice was up to, however, then
it was an act of judicial usurpation; judges have no warrant to read in exceptions to categorical constitutional text. The more plausible explanation is
that Marshall was simply according supremacy to the actual intent of the
treaty makers, which might be to confer self-executing rights in some cases
but simply to mandate further lawmaking in others.20 5 Self-execution is a

201. HENKIN, supra note 22, at 201; see also Vtzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra
note 4, at 602 ("1 argue that the Supremacy Clause is best read to create a presumption that treaties
are self-executing in the Foster sense, a presumption that can be overcome only through a clear
statement that the obligations in a particular treaty are subject to legislative implementation.").
202. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 602.
203. 7 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also HENKIN, supra note 22, at 199 (quoting Foster
for the proposition that not all treaties are automatically the law of the land); Vdsquez, Treaties as
the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 607 (discussing lower courts' difficulties in applying Fosterto
determine if a treaty is self-executing).
204. HENKtN, supra note 22, at 199.

205. For example, the famous case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), involved an
agreement between the United States and Great Britain to protect migratory birds that lived, at
various times of the year, in both the United States and Canada, id. at 431. That treaty was
understood simply as an agreement that each contracting state would enact legislation implementing
the treaty, which the United States did in the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, ch. 128, 40 Stat.
755. See 252 U.S. at 431 ("It therefore provided for specified close seasons and protection in other
forms, and agreed that the two powers would take or propose to their law-making bodies the
necessary measures for carrying the treaty out.").
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function of the intent of federal lawmakers, not of the supremacy of federal
law in and of itself.
Seen from this perspective, presumptions for or against self-execution
are not manifestations of a treaty's status as supreme federal law,20 6 but
rather interpretive rules for resolving ambiguities in the meaning of particular
treaties. These presumptions are much like the more familiar canons of
statutory construction, which likewise provide default rules that come into
play in cases of ambiguous meaning.20 7 These canons take many different
forms and derive from different bases of authority; some canons represent a
best guess at what Congress would have intended under certain
circumstances, while others serve to implement certain normative values
irrespective of Congress's intentions. 20 8 The sheer variety of interpretive
canons in the statutory context suggests that a blanket presumption for all
treaties either for or against self-execution may fit poorly with the complex
set of relevant institutional considerations.
One possible rejoinder to my argument that the Supremacy Clause does
not itself mandate a presumption in favor of self-execution would begin from
the proposition that some canons of statutory construction are, in fact,
grounded in the Constitution.20 9 I have argued elsewhere, for example, that
canons disfavoring broad delegations of authority to administrative agencies
or readings of federal statutes that would broadly preempt state law derive
their force from constitutional values of separation of powers and federalism,
respectively. 210 One might thus ground a presumption in favor of selfexecution in the founders' concern that treaty enforcement generally be
automatic, lest the nation become embroiled in disputes with foreign nations

206. See Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26, at 148 ("[I]f there is no inherent conflict
between non-self-execution and the Supremacy Clause, it is more difficult to justify a general
presumption in favor of self-execution, at least one premised on the purported policies of that
Clause.").
207. See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 195, at 9-14 (identifying and explaining judge-made
statutory default rules); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

323-28 (1994) (collecting canons of statutory construction employed by the Rehnquist Court).
208. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (categorizing canons of construction as
either descriptive canons-predictions of what the legislature actually meant-or normative
canons-default rules that exist to further a specific constitutional value or policy objective).
209. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-constitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611-29 (1992) (comparing
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' application of constitutionally grounded canons of construction);
Ernest A. Young, ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2000) (arguing that the avoidance canon, as applied in
judicial power cases, is a normative canon developed to protect the values in Article III, the Due
Process Clause, and the Suspension Clause of the Constitution).
210. See Ernest A. Young, The Continuity of Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: An
Essay for Phil Frickey, 98 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009); see also Philip P. Frickey, Getting
from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing
Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 399, 403 (2005) (crediting the
canon of avoidance with preserving underlying constitutional values).
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that might lead to war or other unpleasantness. 2 1 But when such an interpretive rule is not compelled by the constitutional text, it becomes vulnerable to
arguments that changed circumstances since the founding render a different
approach more appropriate. 212
Two changes in particular are relevant here: First, the nature of
international law has changed, so that treaties increasingly regulate
traditional domestic concerns and thus overlap with the legislative
prerogatives of both Congress and state legislatures.2 1 3 There is, moreover,
simply a great deal more domestic law that treaties must be integrated with
than there was at the time of the founding. 214 Under modern circumstances,
the need to respect domestic legislatures, as well as the existence of other
domestic interpretive canons that may reflect countervailing values, counsels
against a blanket presumption of self-execution. Moreover, modern treaty
making often delegates legal authority to supranational institutions, 2 5 and
one may doubt whether the treaty makers would always prefer self-execution
in that context. Absent such a presumption, after all, the decision whether to
execute a supranational institution's directives provides a domestic back-end
check on supranational lawmaking.
Second, the United States is no longer a new and vulnerable player on
the international stage, so that breaches of a treaty are not nearly so likely to
provoke attack by the offended nation or other grave threats to national
security. 216 Our nation may have a significant interest in maintaining
flexibility with regard to issues like self-execution, and that interest may fa211. See Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 605-06 ("In order to avoid
the foreign relations difficulties that would result from treaty violations, and to capture the benefits
of a reputation for treaty compliance, the Founders gave treaties the force of domestic law
enforceable in domestic courts.").
212. Cf Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1750-58, 1848-50 (2005)
(developing an argument for interpretive rules as a form of "compensating adjustment" for
historical changes that threaten constitutional balances).
213. Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1671-72 (1997) (giving examples of the increasing overlap between international relations
and domestic affairs).
214. See OONA A. HATHAWAY, THE CASE FOR REPLACING ARTICLE 11 TREATIES WITH Ex
POST CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 18-19 (2008), http://www.acslaw.org/files/
Hathaway%201ssue%20Brief.pdf (noting that the overlap between international agreements and
domestic law has grown enormously since the founding, complicating the integration of the two
bodies of law).
215. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 194, at 1 ("In earlier times, the principal function of
treaties was to record bilateral (or sometimes regional) political settlements and arrangements. But
in recent decades, the main focus of treaty practice has moved to multilateral regulatory agreements
addressing complex economic, political, and social problems that require cooperative action among
states over time."); Young, Historical Practice, supra note 143, at 37 (observing that modem
international law differs from international law at the time of the founding in that modem
international law may be developed by supranational institutions).
216. Young, Historical Practice, supra note 143, at 35-36; see also Thomas H. Lee, The
Relevance of America's Status in the World in Interpreting the Constitution 4-5 (Feb. 4, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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vor deference to executive views on the matter rather than a blanket pro-selfexecution presumption. Likewise, the contemporary United States has created a variety of supranational institutions where it exercises considerable
influence, and the existence of these alternative options for enforcing federal
law-as with Security Council enforcement of ICJ rules-may likewise favor non-self-execution. Under contemporary geopolitical circumstances,
then, no presumption or even a presumption against self-execution may be
more appropriate.
More recent versions of the internationalist argument stress the
Supremacy Clause's mandate for "equivalent treatment" of treaties, federal
statutes, and constitutional provisions.21 7 Professor Vdizquez, for example,
insists that "by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, treaties are presumptively
enforceable in court in the same circumstances as constitutional and statutory
provisions of like content., 218 On this version of the argument, selfexecution inheres, not in the nature of supremacy itself, but rather in the
failure of the Supremacy Clause to distinguish among treaties, statutes, and
constitutional provisions for purposes of the domestic legal effect of
enactments. It may be, as my colleague Curt Bradley has pointed out, that
treaties are simply different from statutes by their nature and that these differences are sufficient to justify a different default rule on self-execution.21 9 I
want to quarrel with Vdzquez's unspoken premise, however, that federal
statutes and constitutional provisions are themselves invariably "selfexecuting." To the extent that they are not, a presumption in favor of selfexecution becomes difficult to justify on equivalent treatment grounds.
D. Non-self-executing Statutes
I have already noted that people mean a variety of things when they say
a treaty is "non-self-executing., 22 0 The treaty may not create a private right
of action; 22 1it may create no judicially enforceable rights at all; it may represent purely a bargain among sovereigns who have agreed to take further
measures in the future. 222 The important point for present purposes is that
duly enacted federal statutes may also be non-self-executing in each of these
senses. That fact does not make such statutes any less "supreme" within the

217. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 621-22; see also Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the
land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts ofjustice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.").
218. Id. at611.
219. See Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26, at 157 ("[T]here are important differences
between statutes and treaties that are relevant to judicial enforceability, and these differences
suggest less of a judicial role for enforcing treaties than for statutes.").
220. See, e.g., supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
221. Vdzquez, FourDoctrines, supra note 119, at 719.
222. See id. at 712 ("Some treaties do not impose obligations but, instead, set forth
aspirations.").
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meaning of the Supremacy Clause; it simply reflects the limited intentions of

Congress in enacting such measures.
Private rights of action have been a controversial subject in federal
courts law over the past several decades. 223 Sometimes Congress expressly
confers a right to sue on a particular class of potential plaintiffs, but fre-

quently statutes are silent on the question. The Supreme Court was once
quite willing to imply private rights in the latter case, but its enthusiasm for
implied rights of action has ebbed considerably in recent years. 224 To my

knowledge, no one thinks that the absence of a private right of action renders
the underlying statutes any less "supreme."

They remain enforceable by

instances,225

public officers in most
they may be enforceable by private plaintiffs in suits against state officers under § 1983,226 and they may
be asserted
22 7
in appropriate cases as a defense against claims under state law.
Some statutes not only fail to create a private right of action; they may
not create any private substantive rights at all. The classic case is Pennhurst
22 8
State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
which involved a federal statute
229
regulating state hospitals.
The statute included a "bill of rights" provision
stating that disabled persons "have a right to appropriate treatment, services,
and habilitation for such disabilities ... in the setting that is least restrictive
of... [their] personal liberty. 2 30 When plaintiffs attempted to sue under this
provision, however, the Supreme Court held that the "bill of rights" provision
was merely "precatory" and did not create any enforceable rights. 23'

Presumably, a statutory provision of this type not only would not create a

223. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 758-89 (5th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (summarizing the law concerning implied private rights of action
under federal statutes).
224. Compare, e.g., J.t. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 426 (1964) (implying a private right
of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), with Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 287-88 (2001) (refusing to imply a private right of action for disparate-impact
discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
225. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 570 n.10 (1979) (refusing to
imply a private right of action to enforce recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, but noting that the Securities Exchange Commission had authority to
enforce those requirements).
226. See, e.g., Alexander, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that even
though the majority had found no implied private right of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the relevant provision might nonetheless be enforceable against state actors by way of
42 U.S.C. § 1983); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 223, at 787 ("In 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress
created an express private remedy for violations of federal law committed 'under color of' state
law.").
227. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that "unless the
federal law has created a federal remedy ... the federal law, of necessity, will only arise as a
defense to a state law action").
228. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
229. Id. at 1.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1981).
231. 451 U.S. at 18.
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private right to sue, but it also could not be enforced through an action by the
government
or by way of a defense to a state law claim or some similar
23 2
posture.

There is, in addition, a far more commonplace sense in which federal
statutes do not themselves create enforceable legal rights. Many regulatory
statutes sketch out the broad outlines of the legislative program-e.g., "Clean
up the water!"-but leave the operative details to be filled in by agency
regulations-e.g., "Don't discharge more than x parts per million of dioxin
into the water. ' 233 It is hard to say that the statute itself is "binding," in the
absence of such implementing regulations, upon anyone but the agency
tasked with implementation. And yet I doubt anyone would say that these
commonplace regulatory statutes are not "supreme" federal law under the
Supremacy Clause. They are simply not self-executing. 4
Finally, a number of recent decisions have concerned efforts by private
individuals to enforce federal statutory conditions on the receipt of federal
funds by state governments. In Gonzaga University v. Doe,235 for example,
the Court considered a claim that state officials had disclosed the plaintiffs
educational records in violation of the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA).23 6 The Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
sue under § 1983, noting that the relevant provisions were conditions on the
states' receipt of federal funds rather than laws of general applicability and
that the sole remedy prescribed in the statute was federal withholding of
funds.23 7 While Gonzaga and other recent cases have considered only the
availability of § 1983 relief, it seems unlikely that such spending conditions
would be enforceable in any other way, apart from cutting off the funding
itself. In this sense, spending-condition statutes seem
directly analogous to
238
the view of treaties as contracts among sovereigns.

232. The Victims Rights and Restitution Act likewise created no enforceable rights of any kind.
42 U.S.C. § 10606 (1990) (repealed 2004); see also United States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 335
(1997) (holding that the Act created no enforceable right of access to trials). The 1990 Act was
ultimately repealed and replaced with the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2004),
which does have some enforceable provisions. On the meaning of the new statute, see generally
Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims' Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 256-72 (2008).
233. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1995) ("The Administrator shall, after
careful investigation ....prepare or develop comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or
eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters and ground waters and improving the sanitary
condition of surface and underground waters."); 40 C.F.R. § 141.61 (2000) (limiting the maximum
contaminant level of dioxin in drinking water to thirty parts per quadrillion).
234. I do not concede, however, that treaties may delegate lawmaking authority to executive
officials in the same way that regulatory statutes do. See infra text accompanying notes 252-73.
235. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).

236. Id. at 277; 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000).
237. 536 U.S. at 287-90.
238. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) ("A treaty is in its nature a contract
between two nations, not a legislative act."); Wu, supra note 3, at 580 ("[C]reation of a treaty can be
described generally as a bargained-for exchange of promises between nations that creates an
obligation under international law.").
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In each of these contexts, the critical consideration is the intent of
Congress in enacting the relevant statutes. Within constitutional limits, and
with the concurrence of the President, Congress is sovereign: it can tailor the
effect of its laws according to its purposes. If it wishes, as in Pennhurst,to
state aspirational values while waiting to enforce them until a later date, it is
entitled to do that, just as it may choose to make rules that are binding and
enforceable by private individuals. It is hard to see why treaties should not
be treated the same way-that is, why the treaty makers should not be
offered the same authority to modulate the effect of a treaty within the
domestic legal system according to their particular purposes. This freedom
may well be, in fact, part of what "supremacy" is all about.
As a distinguished scholar not only of foreign relations law but also of
federal courts, Professor Vdzquez is naturally aware of these complexities.
He thus acknowledges that,
[T]he requirement that self-executing treaties be treated by courts
as equivalent to federal statutory and constitutional provisions does
not mean that treaty enforcement will be simple. It leaves us with
all of the sometimes very difficult questions that arise when federal
statutes 39and the Constitution are invoked by individuals in our
2

courts.

Nonetheless, I submit that the complexities concerning execution of federal
statutes and constitutional provisions are such that they cannot be captured in
any blanket presumption in favor of (or against) self-execution, with the result that such a presumption cannot be justified for treaties on equivalency
grounds. Truly equivalent treatment would require breaking down the different senses in which a treaty may be self-executing and developing local
doctrines analogous to those that exist on the statutory side.
E. What's "Supreme " About a Non-self-executing Treaty?
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law suggests that "[e]ven a nonself-executing agreement of the United States, not effective as law until
implemented by legislative or executive action, may sometimes be held to be
federal policy superseding State law or policy. '240 This may well be so,
provided that we emphasize the "sometimes" and acknowledge the paucity of
direct authority or even obviously applicable analogies. In the following
sections, I offer three brief speculations as to what the supremacy of a nonself-executing law might mean.
1. The Supremacy of Non-self-executing Federal Law.--One aspect of
treaty supremacy should not be discounted: Non-self-executing treaties bind
the United States on the international plane, and they are supreme domesti-

239. Vdzquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 627.
240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 115 cmt. e (1987).
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cally in the sense that state governments cannot nullify or exempt themselves
from that obligation. This principle may seem obvious and of little practical
significance today, but in the early Republic the principle that all states are
bound by a U.S. treaty and cannot "opt out" by withholding their consent
may have had considerably greater significance. Under the Articles of
Confederation, after all, a treaty could not become law without the agreement
of nine states.2 41 The new Constitution eliminated this direct role for the
states, and it may well have seemed important to underscore the national
government's power to bind the states by treaty without their direct consent.
The simple existence of an international legal obligation may have legal
consequences, moreover, as a matter of state law. In Sanchez-Llamas, for
example, Virginia law allowed Mr. Bustillo to seek release from custody on
the ground that he was "detained without lawful authority"; 242 as Justice
Breyer noted, the existence of this state-law vehicle obviated the question
whether the VCCR itself creates a private right of action.24 3 Likewise,
Mr. Medellin erred by insisting that the ICJ's Avena decision bound the
Texas courts to reopen his case, 244 but it is possible that even a non-selfexecuting judgment could provide the previously unavailable legal basis
necessary to reopen the case under the Texas jurisdictional rules.245
Second, a non-self-executing treaty may guide the conduct of the
Executive Branch, and particularly officials subordinate to the President.
This possibility raises questions concerning the power of the Executive to
violate international law and abrogate treaties that are beyond the scope of
this Article, 246 but it seems possible that a non-self-executing treaty might
nonetheless trigger the Executive's authority and obligation to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed., 247 The President might order federal
248
officials to comply with a non-self-executing treaty's provisions,
even if he
would lack, under Medellin, authority to supersede otherwise valid state
laws.249
Paul Stephan has argued for a stronger position, which is that a nonself-executing treaty may authorize the President to make binding federal

241. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX.
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(A)(1) (2006).
243. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 372 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(observing that the question is not whether the Convention creates a private right of action, rather
whether it provides law applicable in legal proceedings that might have been brought irrespective of
the Vienna Convention claim).
244. Reply Brief of Applicant Jos6 Ernesto Medellin at 2, Ex parte Medellin, 223 S.W.3d 315
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (No. AP-75207), aff'd sub nom. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
245. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a)(1) (Vernon 2009).
246. Jonathan I. Chamey, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States to Violate
Customary InternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986).
247. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
248. See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1371 (acknowledging the President's authority to comply with
treaty obligations by means that are consistent with the Constitution).
249. Id.
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law, much as a federal statute may delegate lawmaking authority to the
executive, even though the treaty is not itself "binding" in that sense.25 °
Professor Stephan "cannot conceive ...[of any argument] why in principle a
treaty cannot delegate lawmaking authority to the Executive in the same
fashion as a statutory delegation.,2 5 1 That strikes me as a leap, however.
First of all, as already noted, the Court has denied that even statutes may
delegate lawmaking authority. 252 This is a crucial point because it means that
delegations must observe the customary separation-of-powers divide between
legislative and executive functions. 3 Even if treaties and statutes are
equivalent, then, a treaty could only delegate to the President authority to
take actions that were not necessarily legislative in character. As I have
suggested, 254 preempting otherwise valid state laws-the action at issue in
Medellin-should fall into this excluded category.
One must acknowledge, of course, that the distinction between
essentially "legislative" and essentially "executive" actions is elusive 255 and
that the Court has approved delegations of authority that must be admitted as
"lawmaking" in any practical sense of the word.256 But there are strong functional reasons to insist that actions like preempting state law should be hard,
if not impossible to delegate.2 57 More important, it is not obvious that
Professor Stephan is correct to equate treaties and statutes for delegation
purposes. Delegations to agencies have been accepted in our legal culture
primarily because both the courts and Congress retain significant control
over the exercise of delegated authority.25 s This occurs through judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act,259 on the one hand, and

250. See Stephan, supra note 164, at 22-32.
251. Id. at 24.
252. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
253. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983) (holding that acts legislative in character
must be taken in accord with Article I, Section 3).
254. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
255. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The proper characterization of
governmental power should generally depend on the nature of the power, not on the identity of the
person exercising it.").
256. See id. (stating that it would be wise in delegation cases "to admit that agency rulemaking
authority is 'legislative power').
257. Benjamin & Young, supra note 190, at 2114. Professor Stephan suggests that the Optional
Protocol and the UN Charter must have authorized the President to take various actions pursuant to
participating in ICJ litigation, and that "[i]nferring ...capacity to settle a dispute with which an
international tribunal is seized from an express authority to bring and defend claims in that tribunal
does not seem all that great a stretch." Stephan, supra note 164, at 26-27. But this ignores the
preemptive effect of the President's action on state law. Preemption involves an exercise of
lawmaking authority in a way that managing litigation does not.
258. See Benjamin & Young, supra note 190, at 2134 (quoting INS, 462 U.S. at 953-54 n.16,
for the proposition that "executive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble
'legislative' action in some respects ... is always subject to check by the terms of the legislation
that authorized it...").
259. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 100, at 143 (noting the importance
of APA review for legitimating broad delegations of power to agencies).

2009]

Treaties as "Part of Our Law"

through confirmation of officials, budgetary authority, and oversight hearings
on the other. z6 ° One would want to know whether these checks operate in an
equally effective way for treaty delegations, which may often be to the
President in general rather than a specific agency and which may also be far
more general substantively (and therefore less susceptible to APA review)
than statutory delegations. The answers are not obvious. Moreover, these
considerations compound when the treaty delegation to the executive is one
of authority to enforce a product of delegated
authority to an international
26 1
organization-e.g., a judgment of the ICJ.

In any event, accepting Professor Stephan's argument that treaties may
delegate authority to domestic executive actors proves my broader point,
which is that treaties may function as supreme federal law even if they are
not directly enforceable by courts. Nor would accepting the possibility of
treaty-based delegations make executive enforcement mandatory in all cases.
First, whether a treaty in fact delegates such authority is a question of the
treaty makers' intent-not an ineluctable consequence of the treaty's status
as supreme federal law.262 And second, the President might well retain
discretion not to exercise his delegated authority in any given case.263
Finally, laws often have legal force beyond the sphere of their direct
enforcement. Enacted statutes, for example, are often an important source
for divining the government's interests and purposes; these interests and purposes may be important for the application of constitutional tests or the
interpretation of other laws. 264 It is plausible that even non-self-executing
treaties that cannot be directly enforced would be relevant in defining the
interests and purposes of the government for these sorts of purposes.
2. The International Obligation to Legislate.-More fundamentally, a
finding that a treaty is non-self-executing on the domestic plane does not al-

260. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text; see also Benjamin & Young, supra note
190, at 2143 (indicating that scholars and judges have "reconciled the administrative state with
constitutional principles of both federalism and separation of powers by emphasizing the key role of
Congress").
261. In Medellin there was the further difficulty that the Supreme Court had already interpreted
the VCCR not to override state procedural default rules in Sanchez-Llamas. See Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006) ("[C]laims under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention may be
subjected to the same procedural default rules that apply generally to other federal-law claims."). In
order for Professor Stephan's delegation argument to work, then, one would have to read the
Optional Protocol, the UN Charter, or both as delegating authority to the President to override state

law in ways that were in fact contrary to the substantive treaties ratified by the Senate. That would
be an odd delegation.
262. See supra subpart II(D).
263. See Stephan, supra note 164, at 28 (stating that such a delegation "would confer a power,
but not a duty, on the President").
264. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 121516 (2001) (describing "super statutes" that "successfully penetrate public normative and
institutional culture" so deeply that they become baselines against which other sources of law are
read).
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ter the binding nature of the obligation on the international plane; it simply
means that the signatory nation is obliged to take further steps to comply
with that international obligation. A non-self-executing treaty, in other
words, obliges the nation to execute the treaty's terms by taking action under
domestic law.2 65 This obligation may, depending on the treaty's provisions
and the circumstances, leave signatory governments with considerable
discretion concerning the form of domestic action to be taken.266 But it is
nonetheless a binding legal obligation, both on the international plane andon account of the Supremacy Clause-as a matter of federal law.
An obvious objection to this point holds that the obligation to legislate
is meaningless if its practical vindication is dependent on future discretionary
action by the national political branches. As I have already noted,267
however, treaties that require appropriations or impose criminal penalties are
non-self-executing in this way, and yet no one seems to think that those treaties are not the law of the land under the Supremacy Clause. 68 More
fundamentally, similar objections could be leveled in any number of familiar
statutory situations. Many modern regulatory statutes impose no direct obligations on private actors until administrative agencies take further action to
implement their terms. The Clean Air Act, for example, delegates authority
to the Environmental Protection Agency to identify dangerous pollutants and
directs the agency to issue rules regulating emissions of those pollutants.2 69
Many of the more contentious battles in administrative law have, in fact,
involved an alleged failure by the implementing agency to promulgate rules
that adequately "execute" the intent of Congress. 270 No one contends,
however, that the underlying statute directing the agency to act is somehow
not supreme federal law or that because the agency enjoys considerable discretion concerning implementation, it is altogether free not to execute the

265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 111 reporters'

note 5 (1987) ("A treaty is generally binding on states ...from the time it comes into force for them,
whether or not it is self-executing. If a treaty is not self-executing [a] state is obliged to implement it
promptly, and failure to do so would render it in default on its treaty obligations.").
266. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 22, at 205 ("[T]he independence of the legislative
process... has given Congress opportunities to interpret the need for implementation and to shape
and limit it in important details.").
267. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
268. One would be hard pressed to say that the Supremacy Clause requires such treaties to be
self-executing. After all, most commentators agree that the Constitution requires such treaties to be
non-self-executing by vesting criminal and appropriation powers exclusively in Congress. See
HENKIN, supra note 22, at 203 ("Some obligations, it is accepted, cannot be executed by the treaty
itself. A treaty cannot appropriate funds .... A treaty, it is accepted, cannot itself enact criminal

"),
law ....
269. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000).
270. See Stewart, supra note 96, at 1682 ("A second theme of contemporary criticism of agency
discretion has been the agencies' asserted failure affirmatively to carry out legislative mandates.").
For an example of such criticism regarding the EPA's regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, see
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007).
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statute if it prefers not to do so. 2 7 1 Many contemporary treaties have a similar
structure.272
Even when a federal statute imposes binding obligations that are not
dependent on implementing regulations, government actors may nonetheless
enjoy considerable discretion concerning the execution of those
obligations.2 73 Executive authorities generally must make difficult decisions
about which legal obligations to prioritize for enforcement purposes,
especially when resources are limited.274 And although private parties who
benefit from the underlying legal obligations sometimes ask courts to force
executive actors to execute the statute, those parties have not generally enjoyed much success. 275 Every federal statute that depends on public
enforcement is thus non-self-executing in the practical sense that actual enforcement depends on the further choices of government actors.
My argument thus far has emphasized the fact that typical federal

statutory obligations frequently are more discretionary than we commonly
recognize.
But the converse point also bears emphasis-that is, that
"discretionary" obligations to take further action at the national level may
have a more forceful bite than one might think. In Medellin, that force was
sufficient to prompt President George W. Bush to do something he otherwise
cannot possibly have been inclined to do-that is, to issue an order requiring
276
the state courts to reconsider the capital sentence of a convicted murderer.
Although the President chose to fulfill this obligation "on the cheap"-by
executive order rather than by proposing real legislation-he was nonetheless
willing to risk considerable political costs to demonstrate the United States'
willingness to comply with an international judgment.277 In other treaty

271. See id. at 1682-83 (ordering the EPA to move forward on promulgating rules where
directed to do so by Congress).
272. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 194, at 14 (explaining that "contemporary
regulatory treaties" generally count on state parties to enact implementing legislation to regulate the
private behavior that is the true object of the treaty regime).
273. Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("[A]n agency's decision not to
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to
an agency's absolute discretion.").
274. See id. (noting that agencies must assess "whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular
enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency
has enough resources to undertake the action at all").
275. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739-40 (1984) (denying standing to parents of
black public-school children seeking to force the Internal Revenue Service to adopt sufficient
standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools as required by 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(a) and (c)(3)).
276. See supra notes 12-13, 246-49 and accompanying text. For varying viewpoints on the
Medellin execution, the ICJ judgment, and President Bush's memorandum, see Allan Turner, In
Case that Shook City, ControversialExecution Nears, HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 4, 2008, at A 1.
277. See, e.g., Patty Reinert, Murder Case Pits Texas Against Bush as U.S. Justices Consider
Local Killer's ConsularIssue, Control of Courts Is at Stake, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 8, 2007, at AI
(describing the conflicting positions of President Bush and Texas officials following the executive
order).

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 88:91

contexts, such as the NAFTA and WTO agreements, the possibility of severe
economic sanctions creates further incentives to execute supranational
judgments that plainly lack, in and of themselves, self-executing force.2 78 An
action to execute a non-self-executing
obligation to legislate or take other
279
treaty is hardly an empty formality.

3. The International Obligations of States.-I have already noted that
non-self-executing treaties are "supreme" federal law in that no state has the
power to opt out of a treaty obligation the nation as a whole has entered
into. 280 Ordinarily, we think of the obligation to execute a non-self-executing
treaty as falling on the political branches at the national level. Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Medellin, however, raised the fascinating question
whether an individual state might have obligations of its own under a nonself-executing treaty in the absence of action by the national political
branches.28 ' I submit that Justice Stevens was right, and that this is a third,
important sense in which even a non-self-executing treaty may be "supreme"
federal law.
After noting his agreement with the majority that the ICJ's judgment
was not itself binding federal law, Justice Stevens observed that "[u]nder the
express terms of the Supremacy Clause, the United States' obligation to
'undertak[e] to comply' with the ICJ's decision falls on each of the States as
well as the Federal Government."' 282 After all, he said,
One consequence of our form of government is that sometimes States
must shoulder the primary responsibility for protecting the honor and
integrity of the Nation. Texas'[s] duty in this respect is all the greater
since it was Texas that-by failing to provide consular notice in
accordance with the Vienna Convention-ensnared the United States
of
in the current controversy. Having already put the Nation in breach
283
one treaty, it is now up to Texas to prevent the breach of another.

278. See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations art. 22.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (inducing compliance with WTO
provisions by authorizing sanctions); see also Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with Global
Constitutionalism,38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527, 535-36 (2003) (noting strong pressures to comply with
WTO and NAFTA panel rulings).
279. See HENKIN, supra note 22, at 205 ("In general, Congress has responded to a sense of duty
to carry out what the treaty makers promised, to a reluctance to defy and confront the President....
to an unwillingness to make the U.S. system appear undependable, even ludicrous."); see also
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997)
(observing that international obligations "are rarely enforced, but usually obeyed").
280. See supra text accompanying note 241.
281. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1374 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
282. Id.
283. Id.; see also V.zquez, Treaties as the Law of the Land, supra note 4, at 612 ("[T]he
Supremacy Clause, by declaring treaties to be domestic law, transforms the obligations of the
United States under a treaty into the obligations of all domestic law-applying officials whose
conduct would be attributable to the United States under international law, unless a narrower
category is specified.").
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Justice Stevens also pointed out that, in a similar post-Avena case, the State
of Oklahoma "unhesitatingly assumed" this obligation by commuting the
284
death sentence of another capital prisoner covered by the ICJ's judgment.
To define the nature of the obligation falling on Texas, Oklahoma,
California, Illinois, Arizona, Arkansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Oregon-the
nine states holding Avena prisoners, 285 one must carefully parse what was
self-executing in Medellin and what was not. As already noted,286 all parties
assumed in Medellin that the VCCR's basic obligation-to notify the national of a signatory nation of his VCCR rights "without delay" following his
arrest-bound all American law enforcement officials even in the absence of
executory action by the national political branches. On the other hand, the
Avena judgment was not itself a treaty obligation, and no treaty conferred
287
self-executing force on that judgment for purposes of domestic law.

Nonetheless, the UN Charter's statement that nations submitting to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ "undertake[] to comply" with its rulings was a binding
international legal obligation of the United States and, under the Supremacy
Clause, part of supreme federal law binding on the States.2 88
Virtually no authority speaks to this question, but my own view is that
the primacy of the national government in guaranteeing treaty compliance
stems from its right to preempt, in most cases, state actions that might
threaten compliance or otherwise diverge from federal policy-not from any
bar to unilateral state compliance measures in the absence of national
action. 289 And to the extent that a treaty binds state and federal actors alike
under the Supremacy Clause, a state government stands in the same position
vis-a-vis a non-self-executing treaty that the national political branches dothat is, the State has an obligation to implement the treaty by taking whatever
284. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1375 & n.4 (citing Torres v. Oklahoma, 120 P.3d 1184 (2005);
Press Release, Office of Governor Brad Henry, Governor Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row
Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004) (on file at http://www.ok.gov/governor/displayarticle.php?articleid
=301 &article-type= 1)).
285. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 24
(Mar. 31), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf.
286. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
287. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1357.
288. Id. at 1358 ("The obligation on the part of signatory nations to comply with ICJ judgments
derives not from the Optional Protocol, but rather from Article 94 of the United Nations Charterthe provision that specifically addresses the effect of ICJ decisions. Article 94(1) provides that
'[elach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any
case to which it is a party."').
289. I suppose that, in a case in which the national government had adopted a policy of
noncompliance with a treaty, but not embodied that policy in binding legislation or executive
orders, unilateral state action to comply with the treaty might interfere with the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy and thus encounter the "dormant" preemption principle of Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968). But Zschernig is hardly a robust principle these days, and in any event a state
ought to be on solid ground whenever it acts to comply with a treaty that remains binding under the
Supremacy Clause, whatever the informal stance taken by the national political branches. See, e.g.,
Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 751-52 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has not applied [Zschernig] in more than 30 years .... ).
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steps are necessary to do so. The Supreme Court's conclusion that the relevant treaties did not confer self-executing force on the ICJ's judgment in
Avena thus affected the federal and state courts' power to enforce that
290
judgment against Texas but not Texas's underlying obligation to comply.
In this connection, it bears noting that Texas may well have complied
with the Avena judgment. That judgment required the United States to
provide "review and reconsideration" of Medellin's sentence, but authorized
it to employ "means of its own choosing., 291 Several domestic courts,
including the state trial court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the
federal district court on habeas review, concluded that Medellin was not in
fact prejudiced by the violation of his VCCR rights.29 2 Hence, in response to
Medellin's final petition to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of execution,
Texas maintained that these courts' consideration of the prejudice issue satisfied the ICJ's mandate. 293 While reasonable persons may differ as to what
standard the ICJ would adopt if it were to rule on the question,294 no court,
supranational or domestic, has authoritatively rejected Texas's position.2 95
In any event, the important point is that treaty obligations do not
become a dead letter simply because they are non-self-executing. These
obligations may have legal effects in a number of different ways, and they
impose important obligations on both federal and state nonjudicial actors to
take affirmative steps to comply with the treaty in question. If noncompliance persists in the teeth of these obligations, it is unclear that interpreting
the underlying treaty as self-executing would make a great deal of difference.
III.

The Normalization of Treaty Law

In this last Part, I wish to step back from debates about the VCCR to
consider the more general implications of the Court's approach in Sanchez-

290. It is worth noting, however, that both Medellin and Sanchez-Llamas stand as important
counter-examples to Tim Wu's recent argument that, as a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court has
vigorously enforced treaties against state governments in order to prevent individual states from
placing the United States in breach of its international law obligations. See Wu, supra note 3, at
583-87 (reporting that the Supreme Court vigorously enforces treaties against states); see also id. at
573 ("[J]udicial treaty enforcement turns mainly on who is accused of being the party in breach and
the perceived competence of the judiciary to offer a remedy.").
291. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 73
(Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf.
292. Brief in Opposition at 4-5, Medellin, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (No. 08-5573).
293. See id. at I ("[W]hen his first application for state habeas relief was adjudicated, Texas
courts provided the merits review of Medellin's conviction and sentence ultimately required by
Avena.").
294. See generally M. Todd Parker, "Review and Reconsideration ": In Search of a Just
Standard ofReview for Violations ofArticle 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 12
U.C.DAVIS J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 225, 226 (2006) (discussing the "questionable" standards of review
used to determine whether a violation of the VCCR is prejudicial to a defendant).
295. Like many American jurisdictions, moreover, Texas has taken affirmative steps to improve
compliance with the VCCR's underlying mandate of notice. See, e.g., Houston Police, supra note
156 (detailing measures taken to notify foreign arrestees of their rights).
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Llamas and Medellin and its treatment of treaties and, perhaps, of foreign
relations law generally. My view is that these cases represent a step away
from what my colleague Curt Bradley has called "foreign affairs
exceptionalism," that is, a set of legal doctrines that "distinguishes sharply
between domestic and foreign affairs., 296 Instead, Sanchez-Llamas and
Medellin may point toward a "normalization" of treaty law-toward an
abandonment of specialized rules governing the interpretation and legal effect of treaties and toward assimilating those rules to the ones that govern the
treatment of federal statutes.297 Given the increasing difficulty and questionable desirability of drawing sharp lines between foreign and domestic affairs,
such a normalizing course would be a salutary development.
As I demonstrated in Part I, according deference to supranational
courts' interpretations of treaties to which the United States is a party would
produce an anomaly in American law: It would require an Article III court,
normally entrusted with the power to "say what the law is," to defer to some
other actor's interpretation of that law, notwithstanding the absence of any
delegation of lawmaking or interpretive authority to that actor and also notwithstanding the absence of traditional checks on delegated authority. Such
a regime would not, in other words, approach treaties in the same way that
American courts interpret other forms of supreme federal law. By rejecting
pleas for deference to the ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR in SanchezLlamas, the Roberts Court instead applied the same interpretive regime to
treaties that it applies to statutes.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's cautious approach to self-execution in
Medellin recognized that simply because a legal rule is part of federal law,
many questions remain as to that rule's legal effect and its enforceability by
private individuals. Federal statutes may provide no private right of action,
or they may confer no enforceable legal rights at all. Domestic law approaches these statutory questions through a variety of local doctrines; a
blanket presumption of self-execution for treaties, on the other hand, would
create an exceptional rule quite different from the regime governing statutes.
Here, too, the Roberts Court's approach has tended to "normalize" the treatment of treaties.
Exceptional rules for treaty interpretation and enforcement may have
made sense in an era when treaties were uncommon, dealt with quite
different concerns from domestic legislation, and regulated delicate

296. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390,
461 (1988). For a canonical statement of the exceptionalist position, see United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937). In that case, the Court stated that, "In respect of all international
negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear."
Id.
297. Cf Ernest A. Young, It's Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 469, 517-21 (2004) (opining that foreign affairs law should be normalized and
explaining how maritime law could act as a guide in that process).
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relationships with more powerful and potentially hostile nations. 298 But that
is no longer our world. As Professor Bradley has observed,
In the modem era, both statutes and treaties have proliferated, and the
content and structure of treaty-making has changed such that treaties
are often the vehicle for broad-based legislative efforts. These
developments mean, among other things, that statutes and treaties are
much more likely to overlap with one another and to express
potentially different policy choices .... One should expect, therefore,

that in the modem era courts would become less willing to apply
treaties directly as rules of decision, and this is precisely what appears
to have happened.29 9
The broader distinction between foreign and domestic affairs is likewise
For example, commercial markets and environmental
under siege. 300
hazards-and the regulatory imperatives that go with them-no longer stop
at the water's edge. 30 1 As Barry Friedman has put it, "the globalizing process
mirrors the process of 'nationalization' that has occurred in this country.' 30 2
Moreover, the form that treaties take increasingly duplicates that of regulatory statutes, sometimes complete with the presence of a supranational
agency exercising delegated power.30 3 With respect to both substance and
structure, then, it makes increasingly less sense to have radically different
rules governing foreign and domestic affairs in general, or treaties and statutes in particular.
This normalization approach makes particular sense when considered in
conjunction with the widespread tendency to replace Article II treaties with
"congressional-executive" agreements.30 4 According to the Restatement,

298. See PERKINS, supra note 139, at 58 (explaining that one of the primary reasons for calling
the 1787 Constitutional Convention was concern over American weakness in the world and the fear
that under the Articles of Confederation, Congress could not effectively conduct foreign policy).
299. Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26, at 162-63.
300. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 213, at 1617 ("This Article challenges [the
traditional] understanding of the relationship between federalism and foreign affairs in several
respects."); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 141-42 (2001) (criticizing the approach to the relationship
between federalism and foreign affairs that is predicated on a sharp line between foreign and

domestic concerns).
301. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM 19-20 (2000)
(describing the globalization of the world's commercial markets).
302. Barry Friedman, Federalism'sFuturein the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1444
(1994).
303. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 194, at 14 (describing contemporary regulatory
treaties).
304. See generally Oona Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1239-41 (2008) (noting that
U.S. international lawmaking is currently divided between the Article It treaty route and the
congressional-executive-agreement route and arguing that the congressional-executive-agreement
route should become the sole path). According to a recent study, the United States concluded
11,698 executive agreements between 1939 and 1989, as opposed to only 702 treaties. See
Congressional Research Service, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the

20091

Treaties as "Part of Our Law"

"[t]he prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement can be
used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance." 30 5 A
congressional-executive agreement, of course, simply is a statute; by
enacting such a law, Congress both ratifies and implements an agreement
with a foreign nation at the same time. And because a congressionalexecutive agreement is a statute, it makes sense that all the usual
interpretation and self-execution questions-for example, Should American
courts defer to other tribunals in interpreting the agreement? Does the
agreement create enforceable rights at all? Does it create a private right of
action?-should be answered in the same way that we answer similar questions for ordinary domestic statutes. Normalizing treaties thus facilitates a
uniform set of interpretive and executory 30rules
that can govern treaties and
6
alike.
agreements
congressional-executive
Normalizing treaties likewise facilitates more consistent treatment of
executive power questions. The Supreme Court has developed a relatively
well-established framework for analyzing claims of presidential authority to
act in areas in which Congress may also legislate; in these cases, presidential
power is largely a function of congressional approval, acquiescence, or
disapproval.30 7 In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,3 °s the Supreme Court applied this
framework to reject a claim of presidential power to establish military commissions to try suspected terrorists without any contemporary authorization
from Congress.30 9 Yet two years later in Medellin, the President was able to
claim even broader authority to act-without any express congressional authorization and arguably in the teeth of the federal statutory scheme
governing federal interference with state criminal proceedings 30I°simply

United States Senate, S. Rpt. 106-71, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (2001) (compiling the number of
treaties and executive agreements by year). The overwhelming numbers of these executive
agreements were congressional-executive agreements. See id. at 41 (reporting the percentage of
international agreements that were reached based on (1) statutory authority, (2) treaties, and
(3) solely executive authority).
305. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 303 cmt. e.

Compare Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799,
805 (1995) (arguing that this view is largely correct), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARV.
L. REv. 1221, 1286 (1995) (arguing that the Constitution does not permit interchangeable use of
treaties and congressional-executive agreements). I do not mean to take any position on this debate
here.
306. Cf Bradley, Self-Execution, supra note 26, at 163-64 (arguing that congressionalexecutive agreements are preferable to treaties because courts have some tendency to interpret
treaties differently than statutes).
307. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth a tripartite framework to evaluate the separation of powers
between the Executive and Legislative Branches); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 668-69 (1981) (adopting, in large part, Justice Jackson's framework).
308. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
309. Id. at 590-95.
310. Amicus Curiae Brief of Constitutional and International Law Scholars in Support of
Respondent State of Texas at 14-17, Medellin v. Texas, 129 S.Ct. 290 (2008) (No. 06-984).
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because he was implementing a treaty. 31 ' The Medellin Court's rejection of
this extraordinary claim, and of the exceptional approach to treaties that it
embodied, may well pave the way for a more consistent approach to issues of
executive authority.
It may sound strange to treat internationalist positions on the
interpretation and legal effect of treaties as instances of foreign relations
"exceptionalism." Especially in the context of self-execution, internationalists typically wrap their case in the familiar language of the Supremacy
Clause, which says that treaties-like statutes-are "the supreme Law of the
Land. ''3 12 What could be less exceptionalist than that? And yet, it turns out
that categorical positions like a blanket presumption in favor of selfexecution ignore many complexities concerning the treatment of statutes in
domestic law. Statutes have multifarious effects, depending on the intent of
the enacting Congress. If treaties, like statutes, are "part of our law," then
our approach to treaties will have to be similarly nuanced.
IV. Conclusion
Much of the debate in foreign affairs law over the past several decades
has concerned the degree of separation that exists between the international
and domestic legal systems. This is true not only with respect to treaties but
also with respect to customary international law and the powers of supranational courts. It seems likely, however, that the future will see increasing
degrees of interpenetration between these two legal systems. If that is so, it
is time to think more systematically about what follows from such
interpenetration. 313 My purpose here has been to suggest that accepting
treaties as "part of our law" in a strong sense would not necessarily require
adopting internationalist views on interpretive deference or self-execution.
The trouble with many assertions about the effect of assimilating
international law into the domestic legal system is that these assertions take
too simplistic a view of domestic law. The domestic fields of administrative
law and federal jurisdiction have long encompassed vigorous debates about
the interpretation and enforceability of federal statutes, regulations, and
common law principles that parallel, in important respects, current debates
about the interpretation and enforceability of international law. Treating international law, including treaties, as "part of our law" would not resolve
these questions; rather, it would simply situate debates about the interpreta311. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, Medellin v.
Texas, 129 S. Ct. 290 (2008) (No. 06-984) ("[W]hen the President acts pursuant to a duly ratified
treaty on his own constitutional authority, he acts with the full authority of the United States, and
his authority is as its zenith ....
").
312. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 4, at 2095 (arguing that the Supremacy Clause makes
treaties self-executing).
313. For a broader assessment of the "intejurisdictional problem" created by the interaction of
international and domestic legal systems, see Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 75, at
115-58.
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tion and enforceability of international law within this broader domestic
context.
That is hardly to say, however, that treating treaties and other forms of
international law as "part of our law" would be futile. I have argued here
that "normalizing" international law-that is, treating it in much the same
way we treat domestic law-would be salutary for a number of reasons. The
line between foreign and domestic affairs is becoming increasingly difficult
to draw in a globalized world, and treaties in particular are coming to look
more like domestic regulatory statutes in their institutional structure,
substantive concerns, and impact on the domestic legal system. Under these
circumstances, maintaining highly distinct sets of interpretive and enforcement rules for treaties and for statutes makes little sense. Better to approach
these difficult questions with tools that have already been developed and
tested in domestic contexts. Under these rules, accepting treaties as "the
supreme Law of the Land" is simply the beginning of a conversation-not
the end.

